


JPRS 74661

28 November 1979

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2049



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS	PAGE
ALGERIA	
Briefs	
Moroccan Kidnapings, Murderers	1
IRAN	
Could Iran Become a Second Lebanon? (Editorial; NAME-YE RUZ, 27 Sep 79) .....	2
Swedish Paper Cites PLO's Tehran Aide on Rejection of Mediation (Ake Ringberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 10 Nov 79) .....	4
Former Corrupt Elements Attempt To Whitewash Their Past (Editorial; NAME-YE RUZ, 1 Oct 79) .....	6
Revolutionary Council Member Cites Political, Social Plans (KEYHAN, 27 Oct 79) .....	8
Militant Islamic Group Scotches Anti-Government Rumors (KEYHAN, 29 Oct 79) .....	12
Possible Prosecution of Hassan Nazih Discussed (NAME-YE RUZ, 28 Sep 79) .....	14
Details of Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i's Assassination in Tabriz Given (BAMDAD, 3 Nov 79) .....	16
Tudeh Party Issues Statement Regarding Kordestan (NAME-YE RUZ, 28 Sep 79) .....	20
Government Describes Plan To Settle Kurdish Crisis (BAMDAD, 28 Oct 79) .....	21



# CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Central Bank General Director Declares Government Hard Currency Policy (BAMDAD, 4 Nov 79) .....	24
Inflation, Unemployment Threaten Iran's Future (Editorial: NAME-YE RUZ, 28 Sep 79) .....	30
Steel Mill Production Capacity Increased by 2 Million Tons a Year (KEYHAN, 29 Oct 79) .....	31
Briefs	
Joint Publications Committee Formed	33
Stabilization in the Universities	33
Cooperation With Military Urged	33
Execution of Homosexuals	34
Bomb Explosion	34
Conflicting Reports	34
Oil Output Drop Possible	34
Democratic Party Demonstrations Banned	34
Hassan Nazih	35
Electric Power Plants	35
Iranian Students Criticize Regime	35

## ISRAEL

Begin's Claim To Be Student of Jabotinski Refuted (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 9 Oct 79) .....	37
Editorial Deplores 'Heroic' Statements about Sale of Land (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 1 Oct 79) .....	39
Commentary on Appointment of Hurvitz as El Al Head (Ze'ev Schul; THE JERUSALEM POST, 14 Nov 79) .....	41

## JORDAN

American Dollar Mentality Seen No Threat to Jordan (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 7 Oct 79) .....	43
--	----

## LEBANON

Lebanese Army Commander Views Scope of Current Tasks (Victor Khuri Interview; AN-NAHAR AL'-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 29 Oct-4 Nov 79) .....	45
---	----

Briefs	
Sham'un Dialog With PLO	49

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
MOROCCO	
Editorial Criticizes Undemocratic Government Policy (Editorial; LIBERATION, 19-25 Oct 79) .....	50
Foreign Minister Discusses Sahara Problem, Egyptian Aid Offer, Purchase of U.S. Weapons (M'Hamed Boucetta Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 13 Oct 79).	53
USFP Opposition Leader Discusses Sahara Problem, Socio- economic Problems (Abdelwahad Interview; LIBERATION, 19-25 Oct 79) ....	58
Briefs 1980 Finance Bill	63
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	
Figures on Industrial Firms, Workers Released (AL-NAHAR, 28 Sep 79) .....	64
UAE Oil Revenues Reach 18 Billion Dirhams (AL-NAHAR, 28 Sep 79) .....	65
Briefs Foreign Investments Education Budget	67 67
WESTERN SAHARA	
Algiers Cites SDAR Statement on Fighting in Sahara (Algiers Domestic Service, 15 Nov 79) .....	68
'L'HUMANITE' Interview's Polisario's Abdelaziz on Sahara Issue (Mohamed Abdelaziz Interview; L'HUMANITE, 3 Nov 79) ..	69
Algiers Cites SDAR Statement on Military Victories (Algiers Domestic Service, 9 Nov 79) .....	71
'L'UNITA' Carries Communique on Visit to W. Sahara by PCI, PCE, PCF Delegation (L'UNITA, 5 Nov 79) .....	73

## BRIEFS

MOROCCAN KIDNAPINGS, MURDERERS--The masses inside Morocco live in an atmosphere of fear because of the kidnappings and assassinations, and also because of the unjust trials and verdicts passed by the royal courts against the revolutionary and progressive elements in the country. The secret police watch all citizens--the trade unionists or those who are suspected of being sympathetic to the Saharan revolution. They are sent for trials by order of the Royal Palace; they are sent for trials to appear before the courts which are to a certain extent similar to the military tribunals which the regime set up following the Sukhayrat uprising and the attempt to assassinate the king. As for the kidnappings and assassinations, they have become the main task of the monarchical regime. This regime planned and carried out the assassination of 'Umar bin Jallun in December 1975, and 'Abd al-Taif (Zarwal) and Husayn [name indistinct] as well as hundreds of progressive citizens during January and February in Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Fes and Tetouan; most of them were university and secondary school students. [Excerpt] [LD142334 Oran Domestic Service in Arabic 2300 GMT 13 Nov 79 LD]

CSO: 4402



COULD IRAN BECOME A SECOND LEBANON?

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Ethnic Minorities"]

[Text] During an interview in the publication "Foreign Policy" with George Ball, a former official in the American State Department, and chairman of the Commission to Study Conditions in Iran at the Time of the Revolution, the third and last phase of which is studied in today's issue, this American expert has said that there is danger of fragmentation in Iran, especially if this country develops conditions similar to those in Lebanon today. In such conditions, there would be danger of fragmentation in Iran because of ethnic minorities.

The issue of ethnic groups raised by George Ball is not peculiar to Iran. It exists in many Asian, European, and even African countries. More politically advanced countries, such as England, have solved this problem by decentralizing and delegating some civil and financial matters to the local level. Underdeveloped countries refrain from doing this, fearing that if this authority is delegated to ethnic minorities they will then become independent due to the weakness or ineffectuality of the central regime.

Historically, Iran has always contained ethnic and religious minorities. What has unified these nationalities and tribes making up the Iranian nation is a common history, geography, and economy, not their oneness of language and religion.

Insofar as the leaders of the religious regime have had a share in our history and politics, until now, with no constitution, they have tried to solve this, our most prominent issue, through the use of force, or they have postponed solving it. With reason and the utilization of the experience of others, they could find a solution. Instead of a parliament with one house they could establish one with two houses, a legislative assembly and a house of representatives from the provinces or states, and they could delegate civil and limited financial authority to the different provinces.

This is a modern solution that would settle the issue forever, and if it is not solved there will be war in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Khuzistan, and perhaps Azerbaijan. This issue can be postponed only if the central government remains authoritarian and undemocratic.

9310

CSO: 4906

SWEDISH PAPER CITES PLO'S TEHRAN AIDE ON REJECTION OF MEDIATION

LD131447 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Nov 79 p 9 LD

[Dispatch by correspondent Ake Ringberg: "PLO Shuns Mediation"]

[Text] Beirut, 9 November--"The Americans have let us suffer for 30 years so let them now taste some of their own medicine. The PLO is on Iran's side so we cannot undertake the role of mediator." That remark was made Friday by the PLO's representative in Tehran before boarding an aircraft back to Iran following talks in Beirut with PLO leader Yassir 'Arafat.

With that remark the chances of an active contribution by the PLO to help the prisoners in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran seem to have lessened considerably.

At the same time the Iranian ambassador in Bahrain said that the talks under way between the PLO and the Iranian leaders will be about the hostages, "but there can be no question of any mediation."

It seems that it is precisely the world "mediation" which the PLO is striving wholeheartedly to repudiate in its official remarks in order to refute reports that the PLO is best placed to act as intermediary for averting a massacre in Tehran.

The United States is regarded as the Palestinians' foremost enemy since Israel uses U.S. bombs and U.S. aircraft to terrorize helpless Palestinian refugees.

"We do not expect much from the United States," Hani al-Hasan, the PLO's representative in Tehran, said. "We helped American citizens get out of Lebanon during the civil war in the summer 1976, but what has the United States done for us since then?"

The remark was directed at the wholehearted U.S. support for the state of Israel and also at Israel's attack against south Lebanon March of last year with the express purpose of "crushing the PLO." But since that action the PLO has won new positions in the world.



Notwithstanding these opinions, which reflect years of bitterness against a superpower, it seems apparent that the PLO really wants to play a part in the drama but also that it must proceed with great caution.

Through its new general secretary 'Isa al-Qadi (whose predecessor Zuhayr Muhsin was murdered last summer in Cannes) the Syria-backed as-Sa'iqa organization has criticized any decision which could benefit U.S. imperialism in return for recognition by the United States. There has been similar criticism from the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by Nayif Hawatmah.

CSO: 3109

FORMER CORRUPT ELEMENTS ATTEMPT TO WHITENASH THEIR PAST

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 1 Oct 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Those Who Put the Country Where It Is Today"]

[Text] One of the basic reasons for the Iranian national revolution last January was corruption, which was dominant in the previous regime. Some because of their associates, some under the influence of friends, another because of his neighborhood and another because of his special access to an important official in the government or the military occupied themselves with plundering the country's wealth. In the midst of all this there were many in foreign service, meaning representatives of the nation, who went to foreign countries when they were not really representatives of our country but were instead manifestations of the corruption that got them their jobs.

Most of these "Diplomats" have kept quiet and continued living exactly as before in some corner with their share of the plunder from the treasury in a country where they once held a high title, now recognized only by waiters in cabarets and sellers of poker chips in casinos. Functionally, these people had been removed from the staff of the Foreign Ministry even before the revolution.

Some of them, however, who, like the Bourbons, have not acquired anything and have not forgotten, have been busy changing clothes and are gradually trying to claim, when their very appointment to their posts is the most obvious manifestation of the worst corruption, that they were opposed to that corruption and that system.

Several days ago, one of these diplomats, who suddenly rose from the rank of secretary to the rank of ambassador of a European country because of personal services he rendered, and who greased the palms of his former boss and of a colleague in the Washington embassy through various manipulations, according to the current fashion wrote an article for the HERALD TRIBUNE which, were it no so shameful, would be laughable.

This gentleman, whose appointment from secretary to the prime minister to the office of ambassador raised a lot of hackles in the Foreign Ministry, and whose appointment was taken as an insult and a sign of deteriorating relations by the country to which he was sent, tried throughout the ghost-written article to clear himself, and, by attacking circumstances in which he was a principal actor, to smooth a path for his future, little knowing that for such persons as himself there is no place, either in the present or in any future regime.

It is better that the persons who have angered the nation with their deeds and helped lead it to its current state should get out of the country before the nation takes revenge against them. In order to have their bad names forgotten, they should at least be ashamed of themselves and ask for a share in the Iranian national movement.

9310

CSO: 4906



# REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBER CITES POLITICAL, SOCIAL PLANS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 27 Oct 79 p 10

/Article: "The Revolutionary Council's Economic and Political Plan for Running the Country"/

/Excerpt] After the people had paraded and gathered at the University of Tehran and the surrounding area, Ayatollah Dr Beheshti, vice chairman of the Council of Experts and member of the Revolutionary Council, made a statement. In his statement, he, as a member of the Revolutionary Council, described the country's economic and political policy.

Referring to Moslem revolutionaries' past efforts to break free from the fetters of imperialism, exploitation and tyranny, Dr Beheshti said "Our young generation has risen up with the glorious martyrdom of martyrs, the forward thrust and movement of universities, educational centers and men of the street and the market, and the creative participation of women, and has realized the dreams of decades with valor and heroism through this successful uprising. We have now put the weighty and terrible stages behind us, to the point where I think the stages of the past few years at least remain in your minds. What troubles, what tortures, what vexations and what strikes our people put behind themselves during the uprising standing in the face of difficulties until it threw the basic enemy out of Iran in February! In the past few days, America, our unyielding enemy, has taken him into its arms; I really do not know if he has become ill or is pretending to be ill. God willing, it will be an illness before which he can no longer resist; of course were it to happen that we could bring him alive to Iran, it would be better."

## The Revolutionary Council's Economic Plan

"People have asked us, 'What is your economic thesis? What is the economic plan of the Revolutionary Council and the leadership of the revolution for combatting deprivation and poverty?' We would prefer that a summary of this plan emerged in the form of principles and the constitution and that we then discussed it with you. Now, however, that we are before the Iranian nation on this historic day and this beloved opportunity, we will give a brief explanation:

"1. The Islamic government has the duty of providing capital and tools to every person who wants to perform productive work and to place those at his disposal. Our farmers in the Islamic Republic must work on land which belongs to them. Our laborers in the Islamic Republic must work with tools and capital which belong to them.

"Therefore the economic plan of the Islamic Republic is this: the government of the Islamic Republic is to provide tools, capital and work from the public treasury, from oil revenues, from other revenues and from taxes on individuals for every Moslem, for every Iranian even if he is not a Moslem, for everyone who is a citizen of this republic, so that no one will be obliged to sell his labor for the trivial wages which others give him. Now I ask whether we will be able to save the workers of this country from becoming the hirelings of brutal, vexing wages by this solution. I am asking everyone who is well-read in the field of economics to work on this and to give us an answer.

#### The Revolutionary Council's Political Thesis

"People ask us, what is your political thesis for administering the country? We have to a large extent reflected our political plan for administering the country in the principles of the constitution.

"There we have stated the following: Ours is an Islamic society. It is a society which wants to be administered through Islam. It wants to stay on the Islamic road. The true Islam, the Islam which pious and clear-thinking jurists specialized in understanding Islam who are informed about the issues of the day--these people will explain this Islam to these people. To this end we have stated that our Islamic society will be administered in this manner. The supreme leader is at the peak of the country's administrative power, a pious, committed, combative, aware jurist, a jurist who does not want to dominate, who is not worldly, who is not a tyrant, who is not a dictator, a jurist who loves the people, a jurist who, like the leader of this revolution, says 'I have done nothing--it is these people who are doing it'--a jurist with these characteristics will arise at the head of the power administering the country, but will not appear at the head in such a way that he will be a chief. It is a mistake for anyone to imagine that we say that the religious jurists are at the head, that is, that they must throw in people's faces the claim 'we are your chiefs' through twist-and-pomp, political wheeling and self-aggrandizement. As the imam has commanded, if a religious jurist is seized with this sickness he will have no further guardianship over the people. What kind of jurist, then? An aware, just, god-fearing, people-loving meek, modest jurist, a jurist who is humble before the people. You know that one of the designations or appellations of the Commander of the Faithful (on whom be peace) is Abu Tawwab. What does Abu Tawwab mean? It means that Ali sits on the ground, is humble and lives with the people, that a modest, meek, popular, people-loving jurist comes and is placed in the leadership of the nation. Is this jurist imposing himself upon the people?

## The Role of the Councils

"Does it mean that you tell the people, 'Come and accept this religious jurist as leader?'

"In the constitution, provision has been made for the fact that the people must accept this religious jurist. A religious jurist whom the absolute majority of the nation accepts as leader is the one who becomes the leader. All right, if a well-known jurist who can be accepted by the majority of the people is not to be found, then what? A council of jurists, some of the best, choicest, purest and best-informed of jurists will constitute a council, and the well-informed, elected representatives of you, the people, will appoint this council and nominate and present it. Such a leader or such a council will become the leadership and will occupy the position of leader. Then you, the people, will choose a president from among the people who meet the conditions. You will note that the government which comes to power will be under the supervision of you, the people, in three ways:

"1. Through the leadership of the well-informed, just, elected religious jurist.

"2. Through the elected president.

"3. Through the elected representatives.

"These people can control the prime minister, ministers and others. Who will control the government employee in a given village or a given corner of a remote town? Who must control the government employee, the head of a given department, the commander of a given garrison which is in a remote corner 1,000 kilometers away from the representatives, the president and the leader? This is the duty of the councils. Our friends the students have asked, 'What is your opinion on the councils?' Our opinion is that the councils which have arisen from the people must be the administrators and the supervisors of their actions, while you, the people, do the electing.

"Unfortunately, in these elections to town councils, the number of votes for persons elected is generally so low that we cannot say that they are the representatives of the majority of the people.

"The councils, which are composed of the representatives of the majority of the people, must be the overseers of proper day-to-day operations throughout the country. What about the factories? What about the offices? Do these also need councils or not? In our opinion they do. We have repeatedly said that where these investigations are made one must place a new investigator in the place of the old one, one must place a senior investigator in the place of the old one, one must place a senior investigator over this second one and then place a general investigative office



over them. Come let us create a system of oversight and guidance everywhere out of the body of the masses, so that we will have less need of these investigations from above. The factory councils, the department councils and the company organizations, in our opinion, are among the necessary elements of a popular, Islamic revolution. Therefore, from our standpoint, the mode of political administration of the country, the country's domestic policy, is one where the people, the very masses of the people, must take part in administering the country in which they are influential as soon as possible."

11387

CSO: 4906

MILITANT ISLAMIC GROUP SCOTCHES ANTI-GOVERNMENT RUMORS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Oct 79 p 12

/Article: "In Presenting a Way To Confront Rumors, Organization of the Combatants of the Islamic Revolution Presents an Announcement on Counter-revolutionary Rumormongering"/

/Text/ The Organization of the Combatants of the Islamic Revolution has published a statement regarding the spreading of rumors throughout society and has requested compatriots to disgrace "rumormongers."

In its statement, the Organization of the Combatants of the Islamic Revolution pointed out "The Islamic Revolution of Iran, because of its quest, which results from the profound culture of Islam, has more enemies than any other revolution. To this end, West and East, together with international Zionism, are assailing this revolution from every direction, hoping to nip it in the bud."

In the statement, subjects which have been the target of the propaganda attack of rumormongers of the revolution were mentioned: these were listed as the person of Imam Khomeyni and revolutionary organs and personalities.

Regarding the spreading of rumors on Imam Khomeyni, it was not asserted /sic/: "Since the imam enjoys the strongest base and mass protection, the conniving counterrevolution, out of fear of the people's violent anger, in its meetings and speeches, is always indirectly making utterances about the imam's estrangement from the people under the mask of following the imam's path and enthusiasm for the people and the imam, stating that a number of people have blockaded him and are not allowing words and news to reach him. All people, groups and organizations must freely contact the imam and speak to him.

"By raising the imam's remoteness from the realities of society, they are trying to create an atmosphere of lack of confidence and despair regarding the imam so that they can later easily eradicate the revolution.

"Regarding revolutionary organs and personalities, the enemy is finding weak spots in the Revolutionary Council, the Army of the Guards, the committees and influential persons, making them seem much, much more serious than they are, and spreading rumors that such-an-such a minister kissed the Shah's hand, such-and-such a member of the Revolutionary Council is living in a very aristocratic fashion, the government is the satellite of America, and so on and so forth.

"Thus news devoid of reality spreads about in the society.

"The rumormongers consist of foreign and domestic elements. The foreign elements (imperialists and Zionists) are examining the issues of Iran, finding weak points, communicating with Iran through channels and influencing everything.

"The domestic elements (opponents of the revolution and opportunists) who see their interests disappearing, intend to destroy the revolution with the cooperation of domestic and foreign elements.

"In order to confront the rumors we first must not be the prisoners of the atmosphere of rumor but, by investigation must give a categorical answer to the rumormongers and by recognizing the sources of the rumors and demanding evidence from them, disgrace them utterly."

In its statement, the Organization of the Combatants of the Islamic Revolution also pointed out, "We are not claiming that weak points do not exist, but criticism is one thing and destruction is something else, and the enemies want to destroy this revolution."

In the statement, people who have a role in the revolutionary staff were requested "Immediately to bring their lives in line with that of the emam so that they can impart continuity to the progression toward perfection in their lives and give no pretenses to the counterrevolution.

"We must also be aware that everyone has a weak spot in some way or another and only within an Islamic process will we be able to overcome our weaknesses."

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CSO: 4906

POSSIBLE PROSECUTION OF HASSAN NAZIH DISCUSSED

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1

[Article: "Maximum Penalty for Nazih Could Be Death Sentence"]

[Text] Tehran--(UPI)--Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan discharged Hassan Nazih, chairman of the National Petroleum Department of Iran, who had instigated disturbances around himself, on Friday. In his place he introduced a minister of petroleum who will supervise all operations related to the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries. Hassan Nazih has been under attack by the mollahs running Iran for not purging the 40,000 workers in the Petroleum Department. Without referring to the stepdown of Hassan Nazih, Mehdi Bazargan announced that the new minister of petroleum, 'Ali Akbar Moinefar will also continue to fulfill his responsibilities in the Cabinet as chairman of the Board of Directors and personnel manager of the departments of petroleum, gas, and petrochemicals, which have been combined.

Hassan Nazih was appointed in March on the basis of his qualifications. Until that time, oil industry workers had been on an extended strike in opposition to the Shah which had stopped oil production. Hassan Nazih, a French-educated lawyer, was called in for investigation on the authority of the revolutionary public prosecutor to answer existing charges against the workers of the department.

In one of Ayatollah Khomeini's directives to Bazargan he ordered that assurances be obtained that Nazih would be present for an interrogation on Saturday. At the same time the Ayatollah gave notice that if there should be enough evidence against him, Nazih would be prosecuted. The nature of the "innumerable charges" said to be in the hands of the public prosecutor against Nazih has not been clear.

The Islamic groups in the Petroleum Department have demanded that Nazih be tried as an enemy of Islam. The maximum penalty for this crime is death.

Moinfar's appointment has cleared the way for a "purging" of worker's leaders in the Petroleum Department, to which Nazih was opposed. Nazih maintained that this purge would create difficulties in the production of oil. It is still not known how many people will become "purgees."

The attacks against Hassan Nazih concerning the administration of the Petroleum Department are due to Ayatollah Khomeyni's son-in-law and Hojatoleslam Shahabeldin Eshraqi, his representative in matters related to petroleum.

9310

CSO: 4906



# DETAILS OF AYATOLLAH QAZI TABATABA'I'S ASSASSINATION IN TABRIZ GIVEN

Tehran **BAMDAD** in Persian 3 Nov 79 pp 1, 8

/Article: "Details of Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i's Assassination in Tabriz"/

/Text/ His Eminence Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Ali Qazi Tabataba'i, the emam's representative in Tabriz, was martyred at about 1900 hours Thursday evening by gunshots from an assassin's pistol.

KEYHAN's correspondent in Tabriz, who was the only reporter immediately to betake himself to the bedside of the dying ayatollah at the hospital, gave the following report concerning the incident, from his companions' account:

His Eminence Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i, who was leading extensive programs of demonstrations by the people of Tabriz on Wednesday and Thursday, went home to rest around noon after participating in the Eyd-e Qorban prayer ceremonies and the popular parade. Because of the extensive religious and national programs, the effects of fatigue in him were apparent, but his companions' counsels did not cause him to refrain from participating in the evening prayer, and he set out for the Sha'ban Mosque.

The ayatollah, on completing the evening prayer, set out for his home by car in the company of four bodyguards, a driver and his companions. As the car transporting him reached the Maqaudieh Avenue curve, after crossing Artesh Avenue, it slowly turned toward an alley in order to pass a Peugeot which was going over the culvert into the alley. Suddenly a young man of 25 or 26 who was wearing a green raincoat and a hat came out from behind a bench in the alleyway and appeared before the car bearing the ayatollah and the companions. The assailant, holding his firearm in both hands, took aim at the ayatollah, who was sitting in the back seat, and fired three shots in succession; the first hit the ayatollah in the head, the second hit him in the shoulder and the third went wild. The assailant, taking advantage of the darkness, immediately mounted a motorcycle and vanished in the alley across from Haj Reza Square. The Ayatollah's bodyguards, who had been taken unawares, flung themselves confusedly out of the car and a shot was fired into the air. At that moment the ayatollah uttered the following sentence "It seems my head has been hit." The driver immediately took the

ayatollah to the Red Lion and Sun Hospital and the doctors got to work and operated on him. The bullet which had hit him in the shoulder was removed but the doctors' efforts to remove the bullet from the skull were futile and the ayatollah passed away a moment later.

#### A Threatening Phone Call

According to one combatant, a telephone call from an unknown woman to the head of the Sha'ban Committee in Tabriz a few days before lifted the curtain from this conspiracy. This woman said "In 3 days' time you (that is, the committee head) and Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i will be killed." The committee head informed the ayatollah of this; in response, he said "God will take care of it." One of the Ayatollah's companions had visited him a few days before and said "From the rumors in the city one may conclude that some danger is threatening you. Please permit us to equip your car with bulletproof glass." When the ayatollah was informed of the high cost of this he said "Pay this money to the Fund for the Downtrodden."

One of the ayatollah's bodyguards told KEYHAN's correspondent, "Yesterday an announcement signed by the Forqan Group was distributed in Tabriz's Bagh-e Shamal while the Eyd-e Qorban prayer was being held. The contents of this declaration have not yet been determined and one copy of it was to have been given to the ayatollah. One person visited the ayatollah on that day and said that a copy of the Forqan Group's announcement had been discovered, but the ayatollah said "This isn't the place for it here, bring it to the house." Eyewitnesses state, "Two days ago three suspicious persons took part in the ayatollah's evening prayer in the Sha'ban Mosque and performed the afternoon prayer. The ayatollah's bodyguards became suspicious of them but did not take the matter seriously." It was said that the weapon used to kill the ayatollah was a handgun which left no cartridges at the site.

On this matter, one of the ayatollah's bodyguards said "On the day of Eyd-e Qorban, as he was setting out to take part in the prayers Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i told his followers on the steps 'See how quickly they are assassinating me.'"

The important point concerning the implementation of this conspiracy was the dexterity of the assailant, who aimed accurately at the ayatollah in the midst of the five people sitting in the car, in the dark of evening. Although he had big responsibilities in terms of security and the affairs of the ostan, especially Tabriz, Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i was the only person who did not like weapons; whenever an armed person appeared, he disarmed him.

#### A Synopsis of Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i's Life

Ayatollah Tabataba'i was a combatant spiritual leader who fought with the satan courageously and without fear, in an open manner during the years

the Pahlavi regime was in power, and he did not let up on the struggle for a moment. At the apex of the Islamic resurgence, in the 5 June 1963 events, when the regime summoned the Azarbayjan clerical community to the Chamber of Commerce of Tabriz for discussions and a so-called search for a solution to the political crisis, Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i was the only person who stood up, fearlessly and without the least anxiety over a reaction from the regime, and cried out in the face of the regime's agents "What do you want from our souls? We just want respect for the law from you."

This severe attack by the ayatollah jolted the military commander at the time harshly, and an intense verbal quarrel erupted between them. The regime banished the brave free man of Tabriz, tied him up and put him on an airplane, but 2 years later, when he returned home victoriously, his fellow townspeople feted the son of Azarbayjan in a manner that was befitting only to him. The regime was terrified by this great reception by the people, and the seed of the struggle with the devil was sowed right there. At the peak of the regime's power, Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i sent tremors through the spirits of the regime's agents with his devastating declarations, whenever he ascended the pulpit, and his words intensified the people's struggle.

When the revolution attained victory, he with firmness and expertise prevented the needless tumult and bloodshed which was very likely to occur. For this reason, he grappled with narrowminded people who could not carry out their designs in his presence, and he summoned everyone to unity, solidarity and service of the Islamic republic. His home was the refuge of the suffering, and he repelled every kind of aggression by all powers against the people with a rare courage. He carried out the responsibility he had received from Emam Khomeyni to be the leader of the Islamic revolution of Iran in Azarbayjan for the prosperity and benefit of the people and was weary of every kind of spite or animosity.

The newspaper KEYHAN offers condolences for this great loss to all the fighting people of Azarbayjan, in particular the heroic people of Tabriz, the fighting community of spiritualists, and the families of this brave martyr.

#### Funeral Ceremonies

Starting at 1000 hours yesterday morning, ceremonies were held for the funeral of His Eminence Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Ali Qazi Tabataba'i beginning in Namaz Square and heading toward the Maqbareh Mosque in the Tabriz Marketplace.

Participating in these ceremonies, were Eng Gharavi, the governor general of East Azarbayjan, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, the guardian of the Radio and Television Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Reja'i, the acting minister of education, the great Ayat/ollahs/, scholars and spiritual men, and a large number of people. After the holding of the prayer in the Maqbareh Mosque, he was buried.

His Eminence Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i began his religious science studies in Tabriz and Qom and acquired grace over a period of many years in the holy town of Najaf, in the presence of the great combatant and learned scholar Kashaf ol-Qatta'. Then he returned to Iran and engaged in the guidance of Moslems. Starting in 1962, with the beginning of the Islamic resurgence of Iran, he embarked on the struggle with other religious scholars and was imprisoned and banished for periods of time. In the years after 1962-63, he continued his struggle, starting in the Qezel Qal'eh Prison and then in banishment in the towns of Baft, Kerman and Zanjan.

Later, as a consequence of his unremitting struggle against the satanic regime, he was forcibly confined to bed in a Tehran hospital for 3 months and on emerging was banished again to Iraq. He was in exile for 1 year then returned to Iran to continue his struggles against the satanic regime.

#### Three Days of Public Mourning

Following the martyrdom of His Eminence Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i, Eng Gharavi, the governor general of East Azarbayjan, gave a declaration presenting his condolences to the people of Azarbayjah and proclaiming 3 days of public mourning.

The funeral ceremonies for the martyred Eminence Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i were held yesterday morning starting at 1000 hours in the Namaz Square of Tabriz.

11837

CSO: 4906



## TUDEH PARTY ISSUES STATEMENT REGARDING KORDESTAN

Paris NAME-YE KUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1

[Text] Tehran (Various press sources)-The Central Committee of the Iranian Tudeh party, in a detailed statement published in connection with the affairs of Kordestan, put forward some suggestions to the government and the people of Kordestan for coping with the crisis situation in Kordestan.

A portion of this statement said that the existence of plots and anti-Islamic activities cannot be and should not be used as an excuse for not attending to the fundamental reality, meaning the conditions of the suffering Kurds, and their desire for and need of human rights and justice, or for rejecting their demands and needs in the name of a war against counterrevolutionaries.

Most regrettably, we must say that a knot that could have been easily untied with the fingernails has been pulled apart with the teeth, and for minimal results we have seen some unwholesome processes set into motion: Barricades against brothers, brother spilling the blood of brother, and the poisoning of the country's political environment, an environment which, in the words of Imam Khomeyni, has the greatest need for tranquillity and mutual understanding. The Tudeh of the people of Kordestan say: "We are Iranians and we are opposed with all our being to the secession of one foot of Iranian soil or the reduction of this land by so much as a clod. We are only demanding our true and national rights. We are waiting for the great revolution of Iran, to which we have given many partisans, to meet our legitimate and just demands. We demand an end to poverty, privation and backwardness. It is clear that despite the importunity of some political administrators of the military occupation, there exists in the minds and hearts of everyone a spirit of humanity and reasonableness concerning the issues of Kordestan. Accordingly we propose to the government that it immediately end all military activities, recall the army, put an end to trials and publication of opinions in the revolutionary courts, and announce its readiness for peaceful political negotiations concerning solutions for Kordestan. In sum, we propose two things: An immediate and prompt end to military activities, and government readiness to discuss and search in a peaceful way for a political solution to the problems of Kordestan."

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CSO: 4906



**GOVERNMENT DESCRIBES PLAN TO SETTLE KURDISH CRISIS**

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 28 Oct 79 pp 1, 3

/Article: "Plan To Eliminate Kurdish Crisis Is Approved by Emam"

/Text/ Yesterday afternoon a four-man committee consisting of Hashem Sabbaghian, minister of the interior, Daryush Foruhar, minister without portfolio, Dr Chamran, minister of national defense, and Yadollah Sahabi, minister without portfolio and guardian of the Plan and Budget Organization, whom the government had assigned to investigate the Kordestan crisis, was received by Emam Khomeyni in Qom in the company of Gen Shaker, joint chief of staff of the military, and the commanders of the National Gendarmerie and the Army of Guards.

According to the report by BAMDAD's correspondent in Qom, following this session and the visit which lasted 2 hours, Hashem Sabbaghian, the minister of the interior, stated, with regard to the results of the committee's discussions with the emam:

"The conversation revolved around the axis of problems and issues of Kordestan and the plans which must be brought to the implementation stage in that ostan, which were accurately conveyed to the emam by the four-man committee of ministers and the commanders of the army and the Army of Guards, were ratified by him, and will soon be carried out in the region."

In answer to BAMDAD's question on how the matter of Kirdestan's problems will be resolved with the entry of Daryush Foruhar into the ministerial council charged with investigating the issue of Kordestan, Hasham Sabbaghian said,

"Our staff has been supplemented and the government committee has approved having Mr Foruhar also joining the tripartite ministerial group."

Regarding the issue of the committee's travel to Kordestan, Sabbaghian said "The issues of this committee are political, military and developmental." Regarding a rumor on the reorganization of the cabinet, Sabbaghian said, "I have no information on this subject. These matters are the style

of correspondents." In response to a question whether the committee would be going to Kordestan following the discussions with the emam, Sabbaghian said "Naturally the committee will go to Kordestan."

It has been learned that Daryush Foruhar's recommendations and views on eliminating the Kordestan crisis, which were published in yesterday's issue of BAMDAD, including the departure of the Army of Guards from Kordestan, the transfer of their duties to the gendarmerie and police, and investigation of the conditions of the revolutionary courts in this ostan, were approved at yesterday's meeting.

#### Condition of the Region

At the conclusion of meetings with the emam on the current situation of Kordestan, Abu Sharif, operations commander of the Army of Guards, told PARS News Agency's reporter "In general the region is quiet now except for the towns of Bukan, Mahabad and Baneh, where scattered shooting is taking place."

#### Government Announcement

With Daryush Foruhar's inclusion in the tripartite committee, the ministers charged with investigating the Kordestan crisis and the government's measures for eliminating the dispute in Kordestan and creating mutual understanding in this region have assumed broader dimensions.

Last week, following one meeting, the government presented Hashem Sabbaghian, the minister of the interior, Dr Chamran, the minister of national defense, and Sahabi, the minister without portfolio and guardian of the Plan and Budget Organization, as plenipotentiary government representatives to investigate the Kordestan crisis and delegated its powers to them.

When this committee was presented, Daryush Foruhar went to Qom, had an audience with the emam, and conveyed a report on the results of his second trip and his discussions in Kordestan to the emam. Following his visit to the emam, the country's National Security council examined Foruhar's recommendations concerning Kordestan at an important meeting, the upshot of which was the announcement which was published in the following form by the government yesterday afternoon:

"In view of the concern which the lofty leader of the revolution and the government cabinet have always had for the deprived ostans of the country, including the border areas of Kordestan, hoping to resolve the issues and problems of these regions as easily and quickly as possible, the council of ministers has approved delegation of its powers concerning the developmental, cultural, military, welfare, and budget affairs bearing on Kurdish-inhabited ostans to a four-man committee composed of Eng Hashem Sabbaghian, minister of the interior, Daryush Foruhar, minister without portfolio,

Mostafa Chamran, minister of defense, and Eng Ezzatollah Sahabi, minister without portfolio and guardian of the Plan and Budget Organization. For their part and that of the other ministers, this committee and its plenipotentiary representatives are charged with proceeding to take decisions and proclaim the necessary orders in solving the administrative matters and various problems of the region."

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CSO: 4906

**CENTRAL BANK GENERAL DIRECTOR DECLARES GOVERNMENT HARD CURRENCY POLICY**

Tehran **BAMDAD** in Persian 4 Nov 79 pp 1, 9

**/Article:** "Central Bank General Director Declares Government Hard Currency Policy"/

**/Text/** Dr Mohammad Ali Mowlavi, director general of the Central Bank of Iran, explained the Central Bank of Iran's views on severing the link between the rial and the dollar and the country's economic, fiscal, hard currency, monetary and credit policies in an exclusive interview with **BAMDAD**.

At the start of his interview, Dr Mowlavi, referring to the link between the rial and the dollar, stated "From the start of my work in the Central Bank, I, together with my colleagues, have been intending to consummate the severance of the link between the rial and the dollar, which has been a national Iranian demand. However, it goes without saying that in order that this great action may be carried out, studies must be made and all aspects of it must be examined.

"Since a basic portion of our payments, as well as our deposits, is in dollars, we must be careful lest by taking a hasty decision we be harmed in cutting off the link between the dollar and the rial. For this reason I have carried out preliminary studies; this matter will be acted upon in the very near future without any kind of damage or loss and the link between the dollar and the rial will be severed."

Dr Mowlavi then referred to the issue of the country's hard currency policy and added, "One of the current problems of the Central Bank is handling the country's hard currency policy. In the past, since foreign currency was free, the Central Bank did not interfere in hard currency transfer matters except in special situations. This nonintervention caused the previous regime to adopt unreasonable hard currency policies and lead the country toward bankruptcy. However, following the triumph of the revolution, by orders of the leader of the revolution, confirmed by Eng Bazargan, the prime minister, to the effect that the nation's hard currency and the national capital must not be plundered without cause or reason, we have taken the categorical decision to create a specific foreign currency

policy although the Central Bank has not been ready and prepared to carry out a new foreign currency policy. Of course a limited group of people who cannot export the /is/ enormous volume of hard currency as a consequence of this policy are dissatisfied but the absolute majority of the Iranian people, who believe in the revolution, have endorsed our decisions."

#### Differing Views

Mowlavi pointed out, "In general, there are two differing views regarding hard currency. Some people expect all the income derived from oil revenues to be spent on capital investment in the country and even wonder what need there is for the country to allow people to travel, believing that the transfer of foreign currency must be avoided by all means. Others believe that the hard currency obtained from oil exports must be spent on the essential expenditures of all the people in the country and that often in the past the government made commitments which we cannot ignore, among them to our students, who are this country's capital, and whom we cannot put into difficult straits or render homeless by not offering hard currency for their foreign expenses. Here the government's policy is to adopt a moderate policy between the two views, both carrying out its commitments and invigorating the country's economy through capital investment on the one hand and preventing the smuggling of hard currency, which has increased, in any way possible, on the other. It is to be taken for granted, though, that the government must pay the necessary expenses of certain classes of people, including students and sick people, and certain necessary expenses. On the other hand one must note the important point that we cannot store up foreign currency and not spend it, since the main portion of the country's income comes from the sale of foreign currency. If we do not sell hard currency for rials, we will not be able to meet our rial costs. In any case the government has adopted a moderate policy in this matter, on the one hand spending the country's hard currency reserves on necessary expenses and on the other erecting a barrier before smuggling and embezzlement."

#### New Regulations

Mowlavi then said, "At the present time we are in the process of preparing new regulations. These will involve imports in the first stage. In this regard our policy will be to carry this process out in the short term, with fluctuations in the foreign currency rate, and the government's policy depends on being able to stabilize the foreign currency rate related to imports and not allow inflation to spread throughout the country through imports. Regarding students, although contrary and contradictory educational certificates reach us and forged educational certificates are even sent from certain countries, there is nonetheless no thought for immediate change as regards real students and no change will be made in their foreign currency allotments. In this regard we are also engaged in drawing up special regulations and will determine their expenses through the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that students'



expenses in all countries will be determined. After the conclusion of the coming academic year, we will accordingly set out new regulations so that foreign currency will really be sent to students. Very many times people exploit this situation, and we have obtained some certificates for certain individuals who are 45 or 50 and are still engaged in studying. In any event until the end of the coming academic year no changes will be made in students' hard currency situation and all rumors which have been or are being spread about in any way are to be strictly disavowed."

#### Retired Persons

Regarding the sending of hard currency for retired persons, Mohammad Ali Mowlavi said, "Some people believe that there is no reason for us to sell hard currency at the official rate to a group of retired persons; if anyone wants to live abroad he should provide his means of livelihood himself or at least get hard currency from the government at the unofficial price. All in all, we are in the process of drawing up new regulations for retired persons and other groups which must use foreign currency, and these regulations will soon be implemented following ratification by the Economic Council and the Money and Credit Council."

Regarding foreign currency paid to sick persons, Mowlavi said "The view is that sick persons should travel abroad only if no possible means of treatment for them exist inside the country. The Central Bank has had no means for determining this; as a result of talks which have been held, the Medical System has agreed to take the responsibility for this, and from now on persons who are sick must refer to the Medical System to receive a certificate and receive the necessary certificate for obtaining foreign currency."

Concerning foreign currency for travelers, Mowlavi said "Until the ratification of the new regulations, no kind of change will in fact be made in disbursing foreign currency to travelers."

Mowlavi was asked when the new regulations would be announced and he said "Maybe in 15 days' time."

Mowlavi then pointed out, "A group of people have complained that the Central Bank is changing hard currency regulations every day. This group, and other protestors, must realize that we are obligated to devote attention to the income derived from oil, which fluctuates, and in the short range make hard currency policy comply with hard currency revenue policy and look into the future lest we become burdened with foreign currency reserve deficits and not be able to import the goods the nation requires into the country."

#### Hard Currency Acquired from Exports

In response to a question on how much hard currency is received from exports, he said "At the present time Iran has no major exports. Our exports

are restricted to some traditional goods such as rugs, tragacanth, cumin and dried fruits and nuts, and all the foreign currency obtained from them does not exceed about \$400 or \$500 million. We cannot rely on the hard currency obtained from non-oil exports, but we do believe that urgent thought must be given to non-oil exports so that we will not only be dependent on oil; this will require a careful export program and other elements although the aid provided by the Central Bank will be unstinting."

Mowlavi said, "Unfortunately, the volume of fraudulent invoices related to certain importers and exporters has risen, and close attention is not given to the quality of goods in some cases either. As has been reported, people present invoices on the purchase of some goods where the per-unit cost price is higher than the international per-unit price; thus these people are trying to keep some of the foreign currency for which they have opened credit outside the country. Conversely, in some cases concerning some exported goods, the real price of the exported goods has not been determined and the foreign currency which the Central Bank receives for revenues from exports is less than the real price of the goods, and here too there is embezzlement. People are trying to keep the hard currency acquired from the sale of goods outside the country. To be sure, a one-time forgery by an importer or exporter is equivalent in volume to the foreign currency sold to 2,000 students and 2,000 travelers. Of course the Central Bank has become aware of this matter on some occasions, and we have even taken some individuals to the competent courts and prosecuted them, but the Central Bank unfortunately has no control over imports and exports and these problems are not in the Central Bank's area of competence."

The head of the Central Bank then referred to the list of persons sending hard currency out in the days prior to the triumph of the revolution, and added "We have prepared a 33-volume list of persons exporting hard currency, sending one copy of this to the Office of the Prime Minister and one copy to the Ministry of Justice," persons who want to receive certificates must refer to these two authorities."

#### Foreign Currency Reserves

In another portion of his interview, regarding the country's foreign exchange reserves, we said "The country's foreign exchange reserves increased from 22 September 1979, when they were \$10,936,000,000, to \$12 billion on 19 October 1979. Of this, the sum of \$11 billion is obtained from oil exports."

Mowlavi added, "The important thing is that our foreign currency is now in highly-regarded international banks and that we are drawing \$1 billion a year in interest from the foreign currency. However, my personal view is that we must not keep our oil revenues in the form of deposits in the world's banks--we must turn them into capital investments, since a loss of money is always harmful to the country and we can obtain a greater benefit from the interest we receive with capital investment."

In answer to a question on why oil money is computed in dollars, Mowlavi said "This will have no effect on the country's foreign exchange income, since the dollars we receive for oil money today we can exchange for other money which we ourselves want on the same day. It makes no difference to oil producing countries if they receive their money in dollars or some other highly regarded currency."

The president of the Central Bank of Iran then referred to the status of the nationalized banks and added, "I wanted to say that so far there has perhaps been no more unfortunate Central Bank president than me, since the Central Bank has never had such problems. On the one hand economic problems and on the other hand the problems of the nationalized banks, foreign currency regulations, credit and money have taken all my time, night and day. We have to provide liquidity for the nationalized banks. We must pay off their foreign hard currency debts. We must alleviate their internal problems and draw up their employment regulations. We are busy arranging regulations and rules day and night and we hope that we will finally be able to alleviate these problems in a short period. It is clear that the nationalized banks must be active, for the economic development of the country, and managers who are appointed by the government must furnish the necessary facilities for providing credit to merchants. The specialized banks, which consist of the Industrial Development Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank, the Agricultural Cooperative Bank, the Bank Sepah, the Export Bank, the National Bank and the Welfare Bank, which are continuing their activities independently in accordance with rules and regulations, have not been merged into any bank, conversely, we also have decided that the other banks, in order to be able to compete in a practical sense, should meanwhile be broken down into two groups, and we will soon determine their functions so that they may continue their activity."

Mowlavi then said "What is important is to create regional economic development banks; that is, we should create one economic development bank in each ostan to avoid concentration of activities in the capital and concentrate the activities related to that ostan in that bank, which will have the independence to give industrial, commercial and agricultural credits so that people need not refer to the capital for detailed activities."

#### The Volume of Currency

The president of the Central Bank then referred to the volume of currency in circulation, stating "The volume of currency in circulation in February 1979 was 912 billion rials and this has now been reduced to 858 billion rials. One of the Central Bank's problems is to keep the volume of currency out of circulation by whatever means possible, and the bank will gradually try to keep the volume of currency in circulation within the desired limits of economic requirements so that it is not greater than commercial transactions. Of course, if the volume of goods is greater than the volume of currency in the market, this will be counter-inflationary

and result in a drop in prices. In any event, the effort is to have the volume of currency in circulation within the economic orbit conform to the volume of commercial transactions and respond to the volume of economic yields."

Mowlavi, concluding the first portion of his interview, stressed that any decision made by the Central Bank of Iran regarding its functions will be presented to the nation with total frankness, that any kind of publication, rumor or statement which is uttered or published by bodies without authority regarding the functions of this bank, including hard currency, hard currency reserves, money, credit, the printing and circulation of currency, deposits or savings, must not be heeded by the Iranian people, and that those who mislead people's thinking on these matters are wittingly or unwittingly giving aid to the counterrevolution.

Taking part in Mohammad Ali Mowlavi's interview with BANDAD newspaper were Dr Qasimi, manager of Economic investigation and studies, Dr Abu Hoseyn, chief of the foreign bureau, Khoshtinat, head of the currency circulation department, Khalil Azar, deputy credit director, and Liqva'i, director general of public relations of the Central Bank of Iran.

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# INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT THREATEN IRAN'S FUTURE

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1

[Editorial: "On the Road to Collapse"]

[Text] The economic situation in Iran has become so deplorable since the installation of the "Islamic" regime that Mehdi Bazargan himself admits that only 50 percent of the industries are in operation and those at half capacity. He adds that unemployment has reached 20 percent. Of course Bazargan intentionally forgot to say that this 20 percent unemployment figure is in relation to employment 4 months ago and according to a study by the International Bank this figure has now reached 31 percent (2-3 million people) and inflation is above 100 percent. The temporary prime minister has not wanted to say that if the situation continues this way throughout the winter Iran will break the world record for inflation and that actual unemployment, now the highest in the world, will transform a wave of discontent into a revolutionary wave.

One of our country's leaders in a recent interview compared Ayatollah Khomeyni to someone who hijacks an airplane, but due to a lack of understanding of navigation is unable to guide the airplane and can do nothing but crash. Khomeyni, who is not even the most knowledgeable of our theologians, has no knowledge of political science, and at 79 he is too old to learn. The noble Iranian revolution took him out of the pulpit and placed him in the seat of power, and now, seated there, he still continues to sermonize as he did in the mosque. His sermonizing has an audience of millions but in running the country, whether the regime be dictatorial or democratic, sermonizing cannot implement any plan.

In the final months of the Shah's regime we ourselves said that the Shah had set the country back several decades politically. We must now add that this retrogression, thanks to the regime of the Shah-mullah, has also begun economically and socially.

At a time when the world is preparing itself for thousands of years in the future, it would be regrettable if we were to fall behind thousands of years. It is a national duty of noble Iran to put a stop to the current decline of our dear country.

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# STEEL MILL PRODUCTION CAPACITY INCREASED BY 2 MILLION TONS A YEAR

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Oct 79 p 10

/Article: "Steel Mill Production Capacity Increased by 2 Million Tons a Year"/

/Text/ With the promulgation of the steel mill expansion plan, which is being carried out at a cost of \$600 million, this industrial facility's productive capacity will be increased to 1.9 or 2 million tons in 18 months' time.

In announcing the matter, Jalaloddin Ashtiani, managing director of the steel mill, stated "Following the revolution, steel output was very low, as a consequence of strikes and unemployment as well as a lack of coal and the slagging-up of the furnaces; fortunately, all these problems have been eliminated and it is the only industrial facility at the present time whose production has been above capacity since the revolution."

Regarding the project to expand the steel mill, the steel mill managing director stated, "Seventy-five percent of the operations on the second stage have not been completed; this will be completed in another 18 months, and full production will start on the second stage of the project 1 year after the date of the expansion of capacity at the level under discussion."

Ashtiani added, "The cost of this stage has been estimated at 430 million rubles, or \$600 million, which is one-third the cost of similar direct reduction plants. Five hundred Russian specialists are working to this end."

In another portion of his statement, Ashtiani said "At the present time, 30 billion rials are being placed annually at the disposal of the steel mill by the Plan and Budget Organization, and steel sales are 24 billion rials annually; however, since the steel mill is procuring all raw materials directly and expansion and exploitation operations are taking place simultaneously, steel is being produced at a cost higher than prices on the European and Japanese markets. However, with proper management and a decrease in surplus workers, one can avoid factory losses and make output competitive with foreign output."

The managing director of the steel mill also said, "If we can raise production to 2 million tons per year in the second stage, steel sales will rise to 30 billion rials; under these conditions, the current costs of this industrial facility will be no more than 50 billion rials."

Concerning steel and coal reserves, he said "Our annual consumption is 1 million tons, while the reserves of the Chanarat Bafq coal mines being exploited have been estimated at 200 million tons and those of the Chadoranlu mines 100 kilometers from Bafq, Zarand and Gol Gowhar at 400 million tons.

Describing welfare measures for workers, the managing director of the steel mill stated "We will need 40,000 people in the first and second stages but there are 80,000 people employed in jobs in the steel mills at the present time; the workers surplus to the steel mills' requirements will be used in steel and branch industries." In connection with the housing problem, Ashtiani said, "Measures are actually underway in the area of workers' housing and we will allocate 1.2 billion rials to workers' housing each year, which is provided by 600 million rials from Plan and Budget Organization credits and 600 million rials from steel mill credits. Each year these credits will be placed at the disposal of workers who have no housing so they may build homes in the villages surrounding the factory and the mines, and not be remote from their job environment. Regarding white collar workers, we will give loans of up to 60 times wages and a minimum of 200,000 and a maximum of 400,000 tomans."

In conclusion, Ashtiani said: "We intend to establish a purification committee so that we can take steps in this field. Of course a number of employees who cooperated with Savak in the past have been expelled. According to a bill which has been approved, we will transfer a number of workers to other organizations and redeem others and will retire the official group on a basis of employment history plus 5 years' compassionate bonus."

In conclusion, the managing director of the steel mill added "Contrary to some peoples' statements, the steel mill was not imposed on us but was one of the desires of the Iranian people, and we must defend and expand it."

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## BRIEFS

**JOINT PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE FORMED--Tehran (PARS)--**The director of Domestic Publications of the Ministry of National Guidance said that the formation of a Joint Publications Committee with representatives from the offices of the Imam, the Publications Office, the Revolutionary Committee and the Ministry of National Guidance would guarantee independence of the press. One of the important issues he raised was the difficulty encountered by publishers in confrontations with the many centers of authority and in making of decisions in the last few months. The proposal for forming a joint committee is intended to coordinate these authorities and is thereby a protection against the dangers threatening the independence and freedom of the press sought by the revolution. [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1] 9310

**STABILIZATION IN THE UNIVERSITIES--Tehran (Voice of the Islamic Republic)--**Dr Tavasoli, president of the University of Esfahan, announced yesterday that as of September 29 the University of Esfahan will be open. Referring to the stabilization of the University area and the prevention of probable battles and confrontations he said that some time ago measures had been taken and responsible officials alerted. He added that Hojatolislam Eshraqi, who had come to Esfahan, during a meeting he held with professors and students, along with his assurances that the universities are being purged of some of the extremist individuals and groups, cautioned them to reconsider their modes of behavior. [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1] 9310

**COOPERATION WITH MILITARY URGED--Tehran (Voice of the Islamic Republic)--**The Public Service Office, with the aim of meeting manpower needs, called for volunteers from those who served in the military prior to the Islamic Revolution from 1974-1979 to voluntarily re-enlist in army regiments or units of the gendarmes to assist their brothers in the military services. Volunteers for service in the army, air force or navy of the Islamic Republic should return to the military unit nearest their home. Volunteers for service in the gendarmes or police should return to the gendarmes unit or magistrate nearest their home. [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1] 9310

EXECUTION OF HOMOSEXUALS--Tehran (Various press sources)--The Islamic Revolutionary Court of Kurdistan convicted two homosexuals for repeated homosexual crimes and of corruption on earth, sentenced them both to death and made arrangements to carry out the sentence. Meanwhile the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tabriz also sentenced an individual to death for the crime of subversion. In the Islamic Court of Kermanshah, Ali Pasha Heydari, formerly a sergeant in the army, received a commutation to life imprisonment for the crimes of murder and suppression of revolutionaries. [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1] 9310

BOMB EXPLOSION--Tehran (Various press sources)--A bomb exploded at a gathering on the occasion of the National Day of Saudi Arabia at the home of that country's ambassador. Responsibility was claimed by the Organization to Avenge Martyrs. The explosion did not injure any of the officials or foreign diplomats attending the gathering. [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1] 9310

CONFLICTING REPORTS--Paris (AFP)--It was announced yesterday that all of the Islamic Committees of Tehran excepting those established in police stations have been dissolved. An official of the Central Committee, in an interview with the newspaper BAMDAD, announced this and specified that this measure was taken after efforts to purge these committees had failed. After limiting the number of committees, the recruitment of new people will be undertaken. (NAME-YE RUZ--Though the Central Committee issued a statement to the effect that the news of committee dissolution was incorrect and came out of the inarticulateness of the Central Committee's representative, the same statement mentioned a basic intention of reducing the number of committees from five to two or three and also of purging the membership of unsound individuals and reducing the number of committeemen, which was in fact confirmed by the earlier statement.) [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1] 9310

OIL OUTPUT DROP POSSIBLE--Tehran (FINANCIAL TIMES)--The announcement of the trial of Hassan Nazih, chairman of the Iranian National Petroleum Department, which took place thanks to Ayatollah Khomeyni, unofficial president of the country of Iran, increased the possibility of a sudden reduction of Iran's oil output. [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1] 9310

DEMOCRATIC PARTY DEMONSTRATIONS BANNED--Tehran (Various press sources)--This announcement of the night before last was issued by religious magistrate Sadiq Khalkhali to the inhabitants of the country's western cities: The respected inhabitants of the cities of Mahabad, Saqez, Bukan, Baneh and Sardash are hereby advised that all forms of demonstration and claiming of refuge by the Democratic Party are banned by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Anyone who engages in this type of anti-Islamic activity will be prosecuted. [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1] 9310



HASSAN NAZIH--Tehran (Various press sources)--Saturday the first meeting since the restoration of Prime Minister Bazargan to the chairmanship was held by the government administration. During the meeting, which lasted 3 hours, the proposed Ministry of Petroleum and the outcomes of the meeting of the Revolutionary Council were propounded and studied. All organizations belonging to the Department of Petroleum will come under the mantle of the new Petroleum Ministry. The minister of civil service, in connection with the fact that the revolutionary public prosecutor has summoned Hassan Nazih by way of the prime minister, and according to whose knowledge Nazih has not presented himself within the allotted time period, said, "According to information he has given us, which may not be reliable since Nazih had not come to the prosecutor's office as of 5 pm, it has been arranged that he will be interviewed at another location." As of the end of the day Sunday there had been no news published concerning the interrogation of Hassan Nazih. [Text] [Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1] 9310

ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS--Eng Taj, minister of power, announced the ministry's future plans for meeting the country's electricity consumption. Regarding the Ahvaz power plant, he said that 40 percent of construction activities on this power plant have been completed. This plant, which will be constructed with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, will comprise four 315-megawatt units, one of which is operating now; work on two others has been started, and one is half completed. This plant will be in use in 2 years, according to the plan set forth, and more than 1,250 megawatts will thus be added to the country's nationwide electricity grid. Russian and Iranian experts are now engaged in completing this plant. Taj added, "Prior to the revolution, an agreement for the construction of four 200-megawatt units in Esfahan was signed with the Soviet Union, and, in the course of discussions held recently, the decision was reached for the Soviet Union to operate in accordance with the substance of this agreement and to begin transporting the equipment and machinery for this power plant." Another power plant being completed is the Naka complex, which is to be considered one of the biggest fuel-operated power plants in the world. One 440-megawatt unit in this complex is operating now and, if this trial operation is successful, it will be hooked up to the nationwide grid and put to use in another month. In conclusion, Taj complained about excessive electricity consumption by the people of Tehran and said "When we fly over Tehran we see that this city is many times brighter than Moscow or Budapest; although the electricity output of these two cities is greater than that of Tehran, the people's extravagance makes Tehran several times brighter than they are." /Text/ /Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 30 Oct 79 p 10/ 11887

IRANIAN STUDENTS CRITICIZE REGIME--The occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and Ayatollah Khomeyni's demand for the extradition of the shah from the United States is not in fact directed against the United States but a more or less desperate attempt by Khomeyni to regain his failing popularity. This is stressed by representatives of the Iranian Students' Union in Sweden. They think that the occupation damages Iran's prestige abroad. (Sture Johansson) reports from Goeteborg: (Nadim Manuchehr), a representative of the Iranian Students' Union in West Sweden, thinks that the support enjoyed



by Khomeyni among the people of Tehran is greatly declining as a result of great unemployment, nonappearance of promised reforms and the persecution of national minorities in Iran. [Begin (Manuchehr) recording] Khomeyni's regime has not fulfilled the (?promises) given when he came to power. He has declared war against different minorities in Iran, for example, the Kurds, and he has not been able to manage this war either politically or militarily. He wants in some way to make the people forget all this and to whip up another wave of revolution among the people and regain the support of the people as well as regain his lost popularity. [end recording] [Text]  
LD121952 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1700 GMT 12 Nov 79 LD]

CSO: 3109

## BEGIN'S CLAIM TO BE STUDENT OF JABOTINSKI REFUTED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 9 Oct 79 p 1

[Editorial: "The Student of Jabotinski"]

[Text] Last Sunday evening, on the program "The Week in an Hour," Israeli television broadcast a segment in which some Israeli leaders reviewed the historical attempts and various contacts to achieve peace from 1948 to the present.

Our attention was attracted by Current Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's oft-repeated statement to the effect that he considers himself a student of Jabotinski, that the latter is his teacher whose footsteps he follows and according to whose teachings he conducts his policy, and that he has adopted many of his teachings.

We know that the Herut Party, led by Begin, is an extension of Jabotinski's leadership, and at the same time is an extension of the reform movement founded by Jabotinski, which historians of the Zionist movement consider the strongest, most radical, most obstinant Zionist movement adhering to the letter of the Zionist doctrine.

From looking at selections from a book written in 1940 by Jabotinski, called "The Jewish War Front," one sees that in the above-mentioned book Jabotinski dreamed that world Zionism had succeeded in establishing a Jewish state in Palestine having a Jewish majority and a considerable Arab minority. The author's imagination expanded, and with his movement's executive bureau he drew up his conceptions of the rights which ought to be granted to the Arab minority.

We looked up these proposed rights and began comparing them with the stands of the Herut Party and its leader Begin, and we drew the following conclusion: either Begin is not a student of Jabotinski, or he is an unsuccessful one. Jabotinski and his movement's executive committee had broad horizons, and according to their concepts they would give the Arab minority complete autonomy including land, and the right to enact laws, impose taxes, fully supervise education, and fill state positions according to numerical percentage. Arabic would be considered a completely official language.

We remind Begin of Article 5 of the resolutions of his professor Jabotinski, pertaining to "land," and we ask him, as long as he still considers himself a successful student, to reread that paragraph and compare his present behavior with the contents of that paragraph.

Our examination of Jabotinski's book is aimed at pointing out Zionist contradictions and affirming that Zionist aspirations are becoming more extravagant and radical by the day.

We want to stress that Jabotinski, even with his radicalism and excessiveness, was thinking of building a bridge between Arab and Jew while creating the potential for "peaceful coexistence" between the two peoples. His current student is working to destroy not just one bridge but all bridges, and to bury the theory of peaceful coexistence in the depths of the grave before it even sees the light.

An unsuccessful student--not just in relation to his professor Jabotinski, but with respect to all the peace movements in the Arab east.

We will return to discuss Jabotinski's book in detail, since it is our right and the right of coming generations to study those peoples' method and manner of thinking.

8559  
CSO: 4802

## EDITORIAL DEPLORES 'HEROIC' STATEMENTS ABOUT SALE OF LAND

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 1 Oct 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Vehement Claim of Seriousness and Frantic Clamor"]

[Text] Israel has permitted Israelis to buy land in the occupied territories, thereby permitting an act which was not originally forbidden. Most people might not know that the Qeren Qayyemet established a branch under the name "Mamuta," in accordance with West Bank law, and made a West Bank city its headquarters. As an Arab company it bought Arab land, mostly with dubious deeds and through persons assuming the character of someone else. The Hawsan village real estate issue is but one overt manifestation of this company's activities.

Sadly and unfortunately, this Israeli step stirred up an outcry at home and abroad. Within the country, people started talking, daytime heroes and nighttime bats, and held secret, serious meetings in the manner of James Bond. Their meetings resulted in the issuance of heroic, visionary statements to clearly prove that they didn't know what was happening in their country. They didn't have enough time for such lucrative activities, and they were preoccupied more with statements than with any other profitable activity. These statements will not save a single one of our country's stones from being lost, nor will they protect a single oak tree of our country's forests. These people disbanded after demonstrating their ignorance and arousing the laughter and derision of their enemies. The verse "O nation at whose ignorance all the nations laughed" is applicable to them.

Do those heroes know how the land is leaking away to non-Arabs? Do those heroes know that 'Adasa Pond in Bayt Hanina, and the lands of Kafr 'Aqab, and the lands of al-Baqi'ah, and the property of the Qatinah family in Jerusalem were sold with forged deeds? Do those heroes know that some of those who signed the deeds as sellers died scores of years ago? Do they know that the Israeli security authorities are not taking legal steps against the forgers, liars and swindlers? If they know all this, and still issued those heroic statements, then that is a calamity. If they don't know, then the calamity is greater. The sale of land cannot be dealt with by obsolete methods, but by other methods which those who claim to preside over patriotic action ought

to know. Otherwise, let them be silent, and be content with what they are familiar with.

The feverish outcry has spread to the Arab world and it has fallen into the same trap. We find that this world has the excuse of being very ignorant about us.

Recently, AL-QUDS reprinted the Kuwaiti paper AL-MATAN's editorial about the purchase of land from whomever wants to sell. It was a serious editorial calling to mind the tragedy of the "National Fund." We don't want the land to be sold, neither to Israelis nor to Arab capital. The obvious, frank answer is that even if Israel would not resort to appropriation, confiscation and declaration of closed military zones, then we still would not want to sell. We will adhere to this stand.

The land is the nation and if we lose the land we lose the nation. Whoever has no land has no nation.

8559  
CSO: 4802



## COMMENTARY ON APPOINTMENT OF HURVITZ AS EL AL HEAD

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Nov 79 p 3

[Article by Ze'ev Schul]

[Text] **Is El Al headed for brighter skies or for a crash landing asks The Post's ZE'EV SCHUL in this viewpoint story following the surprise appointment of Avraham Shavit as the airline's new board chairman yesterday.**

The nomination of industrial wunderkind Avraham "Buma" Shavit as board chairman of El Al will probably be remembered in the airline as the day lightning struck. Shavit may not be much of an aviation expert — his specialisation is kitchen stoves — but he has a reputation as a man who gets things done. And he usually lives up to this reputation.

El Al will thus have the distinction of becoming the first economic body to experience the untender mercies of the new Finance Minister Yigael Hurvitz.

Shavit is Hurvitz's choice. This double-barrelled combination bodes no good for any conservative dishard who may still be holding on to his desk at El Al — for the airline is about to set an example, one way or another.

So far reports have it that dismissals right down the line are seen as the panacea for El Al's ailments. Last-in-first-out. All this comes accompanied by additional rumours of massive sales of planes and equipment, to help trim the company.

Unprofitable schedules will also be discontinued. Fuel-guzzling 707 Boeings will be discarded and flight crews, above all, will be made to toe the line and take pay cuts — or look for greener pastures elsewhere.

It is all the company management has ever wanted to do to its staffers. The one remaining question is: will these measures save the company, and are all of them really necessary?

The company's history contains some significant pointers that may help answer these questions.

Initially El Al was a nondescript airline patronised by cranks and the few fascinated by the thought of "Yiddishkeit" several thousand feet up. What eventually "made" the line was its technological supremacy.

This was achieved the day the (then) commercial manager, Mordechai Ben Ari fought for the purchase of a couple of turbo prop Britannias. This at a time when Boeing jets were already in the offing and world travellers and their agents were still reeling under the impact of the Comet (BOAC)

crashes. With the Comets grounded — and El Al the only non-British company to operate these aircraft, El Al's Britannias made aviation news overnight.

They won and held the Atlantic Blue Ribbon (fastest crossing) — flew the longest unrefuelled distances as the latest-design aircraft.

Within months El Al, which had for its first few years been almost persistently in the red, was equally firmly in the black. The line was not to climb out of that pleasant dark hue again until two years ago.

The acquisition of the Britannias later enabled the company to bide its time in taking its pick of the new "pure jets" that followed. The company's aura of technological supremacy persisted, in spite of its uncouth cabin staff and ground attendants, not to mention strikes or good, old-fashioned Levantine madonnas. The crowds stayed with El Al, and so did the profits.

Security was another asset. Getting frikked was as much a part of the El Al quality as the wingman prayer on board transatlantic flights.

But all that evaporated. El Al's ageing fleet — with the exception of a few late-design Jumbos — looked shabby. The food was indifferent — the cabin crews (by and large) ditto and the toilets were hopeless.

What El Al needs to rejuvenate it would be new-generation aircraft. Something technologically ahead the way the Britannias were. "Yiddishkeit" isn't going to win the passengers back — especially now that the competition of Laker charter flights has cut prices on the London and transatlantic route to the bone.

One way of increasing occupancy rates without adding costs would be by means of newer aircraft without any increase in staff, although there are those who argue that the present

staff is in keeping with El Al's ambitious network of destinations.

With the cream skimmed off the market, airlines must now contend with lower profit margins. This also makes necessary new aircraft with lower fuel consumption and faster turn-around capability.

Management made its bid for the European Airbus, but was denied funding by the Treasury. The management should have drawn the right conclusions then and there, and not waited until now, two years too late.

If El Al is trimmed down now it may prove difficult to undo the damage later. There are, after all, prospects in sight. Cairo is one of them. This might give El Al, and its Egyptian counterpart of course, that extra little edge of a novelty required to climb back onto the black.

Once the pilots are dismissed and the crews dispersed, it will take a long time and tremendous sums to get them back.

Has anyone figured out how much it costs to produce an Israeli pilot — and what his loss means in terms of pure investment. As reservists they are now part of the back bone of our defence. The loss of even ten of them (and more than that have already left the country in recent years) is greater than any loss El Al is going to chalk up within a year or two. This is in terms of hard currency — without considering the human aspects or bearing in mind that El Al is often the bait at the end of a long, gruelling air force stint.

But this is one aspect that doesn't seem to fit into anyone's calculations.

A final unanswered question; why is overstaffing blamed for El Al's troubles, when it is a fact that expenses for staff calculated on a passenger mile basis are lower than they are with profit-making companies in the U.S., Italy, Canada, Switzerland and Germany — no names mentioned?

AMERICAN DOLLAR MENTALITY SEEN NO THREAT TO JORDAN

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 7 Oct 79 p 1

[Editorial: "American Arrogance"]

[Text] King Husayn has returned from the United States after staying there about 2 weeks, during which time he delivered his speech to the UN General Assembly. The king returned without having met President Jimmy Carter, which is rare whenever a head of state visits the United States even on an unofficial visit.

It is no secret that King Husayn wanted and desired this meeting. But President Carter, expressing his displeasure with Jordan's Arab policy, refused to meet him, excusing himself by saying that he didn't have enough time, as reported by NEWSWEEK in its last issue.

This American arrogance and abnormal behavior will not harm King Husayn, nor will it affect his standing with his people and the Arabs. But it offers new proof that the United States will not be a suitable mediator for the Palestinian issue, and that it has assumed a position on the basis of one aspect and has closed its eyes to all other aspects.

This conduct also offers new proof that the United States continues to operate according to the Dollar Mentality, meaning that it believes that it can buy the will of peoples and take over the reins of their policy by paying dollars.

It is no secret that Jordan receives support, aid and loans from the United States, and it is no secret that Jordan cannot easily give up this aid. But in no way does accepting aid mean surrendering one's political will and sound national line. Jordan prefers adherence to the Arab right, and going along with the Arab community as dictated by Arab interests, to the millions of urgently needed dollars it receives from America.

Whether America likes it or not, Jordan has a primary, fundamental role in the problems of our Arab world in general and the Palestinian cause in particular. Those who advised the American president to behave as he did were closer to utter ignorance than they were to the wise political course.

In the past the United States has behaved similarly towards some of our Middle East states. We might mention Turkey as an example; they suspended aid to it because of its stand on the Cyprus issue, then came back to bow before the Turkish government, making excuses for their hasty, thoughtless stand.

This will not harm Jordan or the Jordanian people. In fact, its economy might flourish because of Arab aid. What will be affected will be the biased American role in the Palestinian cause.

8559

CSO: 4802

LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER VIEWS SCOPE OF CURRENT TASKS

LD051521 Paris AN-NASSAR AL'-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 29 Oct-4 Nov 79  
pp 10, 11, 12, 13 LD

[Interview with Lebanese Army Commander Gen Victor Khuri by Nihad al-Mashnuq  
--place and date not given]

[Excerpt] Question: Should the army command decide to deploy the army in the south, what steps could be taken and what would be the obstacles?

Answer: The army's priority task has been and still is to see that the state's authority is established over all Lebanese territory, particularly in the south where it is mostly lacking. However, the fact that the question of the south is linked to a great extent with numerous local, Arab and international factors could impede the deployment of the army. At present, we can strengthen our role by standing alongside the UN forces to insure the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. This requires the Palestinian resistance not to obstruct our task. It also requires international pressure on Israeli to make it respect Lebanon's sovereignty and adhere to the armistice agreement concluded with it in 1948.

Despite this, we can enter the south, to change the bitter situation it is experiencing, provided that political work continues to bolster our presence there. We do not wish to cause the situation to explode there, but the reverse.

Question: What is the nature of the relationship between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian resistance? What is the position regarding the military agreements between the army and the resistance?

Answer: There are no agreements between the army and the resistance, but there are agreements between the state and the resistance. These agreements became obsolete because they were stillborn. Had those who signed the Cairo agreement been able to implement its provisions in advance, they would not have signed it [sentence as published].



The current relations between the army and the resistance are going through the process of eliminating convulsions and strengthening mutual confidence. This requires efforts by the Palestinian resistance, so that its dealings with the Lebanese Army can be similar to its dealings with the other Arab armies.

The Palestinian resistance took over the south on the disintegration of the army. The resistance ought to return the south to the army, now that the army has been rebuilt. Moreover, a military interpretation of the political Cairo agreement necessitates the presence of two parties; and so far, I have no presence in the south.

Question: Historically, strong relations exist between the Lebanese military establishment and its Syrian counterpart. It is observed that this policy has not been adhered to for quite some time. What is the reality of Lebanese-Syrian military relations, discounting the question of the "deterrent forces"?

Answer: The relationship between the military personnel is now strong. It is also strong in the territory where the two armies are present. The existence of some gaps is not worth mentioning when considering the ultimate target, namely, the common enemy. Israel occupies the Golan and is committing aggression against Lebanese territory. Any dispute would be a dispute among brothers, despite the difficult circumstances in which we are working and which could be caused by the presence of an army other than the national army even though a fraternal one. Relations of mutual confidence and cooperation were resorted to when the rebuilding of the army started.

Question: How do you view the Lebanese military position in the event of war between Syria and Israel?

Answer: What threatens Syria naturally threatens Lebanon. Every time there was a threat, Lebanon honored, and it continues to honor, its obligations within the framework of the Joint Arab Defense Council. It has not withheld, nor will it withhold its capabilities from Syria. If a war breaks out between Syria and Israel, the Lebanese military position should not be viewed in isolation from the Arab military position as a whole but within our capabilities to date. The Joint Arab Defense Council is aware of these capabilities because we send it periodical detailed reports on the phases we have completed in rebuilding the army.

Question: Those who oppose the army express their opposition only to certain personnel, whereas nobody is saying anything about the army's policy. What is the context of this policy, and on what political basis is the present buildup being carried out?

Answer: Within our present capabilities we pay attention to the situation inside the borders and not outside. We refuse to side with one group against

another. We also refuse to allow one group to overpower another. Our goals are modest. We are against anyone who carries arms in place of the army, because according to military regulations only the army has the right to carry arms. Our cause is legitimacy and its defense. Our enemy is whoever threatens security from inside or outside our borders.

Question: What is the army command's view of the question of relations with Israel in the light of accusations that certain political parties have such relations, and what are the army's relations with Israel within the joint armistice commissions?

Answer: It is wrong to call the armistice commission meetings relations with Israel. The armistice commission meets under UN supervision and in the presence of UN officers. We try continuously to revive the work of this commission because it implies Israeli recognition of the international borders provided for in the 1948 agreement. Lebanon adheres to this agreement in order to preserve the security of its borders, despite the attempts by the Israeli military to evade the agreement. Regarding the accusation that certain political quarters have relations with Israel, that question must be put to them.

Question: The parties that are calling for all security matters in Lebanon to be entrusted to the army are the very same parties that clash with the army. What is the nature of relations between the army and these forces and how do you view their future?

Answer: The question, of course, refers to "the Lebanese front." In fact, the front believes that the deployment of the army has always been carried out in areas under its influence and at its expense, while the army is not deployed in the influence areas of other organizations. The relations between the army and these parties is the same as between the army and other parties. Briefly, the idea is to make the army the only force capable of doing away with excuses for any party, regardless of its characters, to carry arms and to defend the citizens against whatever threatens them or is believed to be threatening them.

The army does not want to be deployed in the rear of a particular group to the advantage of another. The army's plan is to be deployed in the interest of the Lebanese people as a whole. I believe that the political conflict, which has turned into armed conflict, must be taken back to its right place in the democratic institutions.

Question: Some people say that, had the Lebanese Army fought Israel, it would not have disintegrated, and no one would have dared to stand against it. Evidence for this can be seen in the Arab countries that fought Israel as well as in the instances when attack on a Lebanese unit in the south generated unanimous Lebanese support [for the army].

Answer: Those who have said these things could be right. But the Jordanian Army that fought against Israel used this as a legal excuse to strike at the resistance. I do not wish to do the same. However, I would like to recall the battles that the Lebanese Army fought against Israel in September 1972 despite the imbalance of strength. The army files contain names of scores of martyrs who fell as a result of Israeli bombing or operations between 1969 and 1975. I was posted in the south for 11 years, during which I saw 100 clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Israeli forces. In 1974 one single bomb killed 5 officers with one blow in Tyre barracks, and in 1967 we set up a Palestinian battalion in Tyre and were tensely waiting for the army command's order to fight. But 'Abd al-Nasir's 9 June surrender sent everyone back to his work.

Question: It is being said that you are in constant contact with Sa'd Haddad in the border strip and that his salary and the salaries of his troops are sent to him by the army command. Is this true?

Answer: There is no contact with Haddad, not even indirectly. The salaries have been stopped, and Haddad has been referred to a disciplinary board. He has been dismissed from the army and is no longer a member of the military. As for those who are with him, we will look into their cases in the light of Lebanese law when we are able to contact them and free them from the pressures being brought on them. I believe that Sa'd Haddad completely lost control when the Kawkaba battalion was dispatched [no further details] and decision-making became entirely Israeli. Despite the fact that there is no contact, I would like to ask: Why is the Jordanian regime allowed to be in contact with the inhabitants of the occupied West Bank and the Syrian regime to be in contact with its own people in the occupied Golan, under the slogan of seeking to liberate the land and the people from Israeli occupation, while Lebanon is asked to liberate its land and people by cutting off relation with those living in the border strip?

Question: Is the Lebanese Army ready or getting ready to take over its tasks in all Lebanese cities in the event of a security vacuum?

Answer: We hope that no security vacuum will occur but rather an organized deployment of the army. A security vacuum would require rapid political action by all the parties. The Lebanese Army is now capable of taking additional security tasks in a number of Lebanese cities, particularly in Beirut, but it is still in need of close and strong support from the "Arab deterrent forces" so that, gradually and in coordination with these forces, it can carry out such tasks once a political decision on this is made.

I would like to point out there that the rebuilding of the Lebanese Army should not be interpreted as ending the Arab deterrent forces' task.

CSO: 4802

## LEBANON

### BRIEFS

SHAM'UN DIALOG WITH PLO—[Unnamed radio correspondent's 2 November interview in Beirut with former Lebanese President Camille Sham'un—recorded] [Excerpt] [Question] Your excellency, in a statement today Abu Iyad [Fatah Central Committee member] called for a dialog with the Lebanese front. Do you think that this statement was in response to your repeated calls for a dialog, and do you agree to meet with him? [Answer] I have not seen the statement made by Abu Iyad. However, since I have called for a dialog, I am ready in principle to enter into one. I have no objection, providing the dialog is based on one principle: That Lebanon has absolute sovereignty over all its territory and that the question of settling Palestinians in Lebanon and their acquiring of Lebanese citizenship should not be discussed in any way. [NC022006 Voice of Lebanon (Clandestine) in Arabic to Lebanon 1715 GMT 2 Nov 79 NC]

CSO: 4802

## EDITORIAL CRITICIZES UNDEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT POLICY

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 19-25 Oct 79

[Editorial]

[Text] The unconstitutional actions of the Moroccan administrative apparatus no longer need be demonstrated. After the rigging of the results of the communal elections in 1976 and the legislative elections in 1977, after the flagrant violation of the clauses of the constitution on the right to strike and the dismissal of 1500 teachers and health officials, this is an administration which no longer wears kid gloves to prove that texts, laws, and legality no longer have intangible value.

The affair of the Municipal Council of Ifni is already testimony to the manifest lack of constitutionality in the action of the administration. From that time the question has been: who is responsible for what in this country? Are we really within the framework of a normal operation of the constitutional system or is this the more or less whitewashed exception? Since 3 years after the communal elections, the administration still finds the means to intervene to mould the political configuration of the Municipal Council of the city of Ifni, the moves were not so complete on 12 November. To designate a president in the place of the legitimate president opens the enigma to two possibilities:

1. Whether this was only one action among so many others to thwart the opposition in our country particularly since the president of the Municipal Council of the city of Ifni is an active militant of the USFP [Socialist Union of People's Forces] and the CDT [Democratic Labor Federation]. He served a 4-month prison sentence as a result of the strike of teachers last April. It is as much as saying that nothing but declarations remain of the Opposition Statute in the Moroccan constitutional system. Furthermore Morocco is in a fair way to gain itself international renown in the art and style of concocting texts and speeches on democracy and of ignoring them in the interests of everything except democracy. But this two-faced policy is far from insuring our country the international support necessary to it in such crucial circumstances as those in which it finds itself. Just as it only erodes a so precious internal front for national mobilization around



the defense of our national integrity. If one therefore passes over in silence these two aspects of the immediate political viability of the democratic functioning of Moroccan political life, the other key question still remains: what mode of power do the Moroccan government leaders intend to exercise?

2. If the affair of the Municipal Council of Ifni does not forcibly raise this question, it still raises another just as important question--namely, the reality of the centers of political decision in our country. In this affair are we facing an initiative which is strictly attributable to local zeal, an intervention of occult forces in unavowed but very significant designs, or simply a declared, deliberate, and considered choice of the government? There are as many question marks as there are indications of the serious process which our country has been adopting in recent times with regard to the relationship of those who govern with the governed.

Actually in its smallest machinery, the state reflects this dilution of responsibilities. And perhaps the explanation of the paradox of the governmental action may be found here: the total absence in serving the masses but omnipresence to oppress or even domesticate them. One cannot even speak any more of a tentative aborting of democratic experience, since the truth is that it is complete reality.

So? Is it necessary to search for the more plausible of the two possibilities or can one anticipate a reply from the circles concerned anyway? Both certainly place the constitutionality of the administrative action and its power at the center of the national preoccupations. For after all it is a question of knowing if the individual as well as the collective possess even a modicum of legal protection against the "supra-constitutional administration." It goes without saying that it is not a statement of the texts which is demanded here. For a long time now the texts have had only a formal significance. After all, does the government not permit itself to interpret them unilaterally, independently of the imperative legal procedure for such action? The affair of the dismissal of the teachers and the health officers is in a fair way of becoming a milestone in distortion of the law.

Concretely, the government is called upon to break the silence it has adopted on the subject of Ifni. But not for the pleasure of the Chamber of Representatives. It is with regard to the credibility of the Moroccan constitutional system that the attitude of the government is the determining factor. Through its position the government will prove what exists and what no longer exists of the "democratic experience" as intrinsic value. Let us point out, however, that for us the time or illusions is long since past. On the contrary, the time for frankness is still with us. Frankness in action and frankness in intentions are still the two fundamental terms of all frank and above all durable and beneficial relations for the future of Morocco.

In any case, this affair shows, if there is any need to, that democracy is still to be built in our country. And that those who believe that they are able to change the popular will no longer have illusions. The struggle will be continued at Ifni as everywhere else for an ideal which goes beyond the framework of political principles because of its historic significance in our country: democracy.

6108

CSO: 4400

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES SAHARA PROBLEM, EGYPTIAN AID OFFER, PURCHASE OF U.S. WEAPONS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 13 Oct 79 pp 24-25

[Interview With M'Hamed Boucetta, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Basim al-Mu'allim; "No Egyptian Army in Morocco; We Will Purchase Weapons From United States and From Others; Morocco Abides by Its Position Toward Camp David Accords and Egyptian Regime; Plan Aimed at Providing African Countries With Outlet on Atlantic Ocean"]

[Text] New York--Since the OAU [Organization of African Unity] summit that was held in Monrovia last August and the resolution of the Committee of Africa's Sages to conduct a referendum in the Western Sahara, the conflict over the Sahara has been assuming two forms: A military form reflected in Morocco's annexation of (Wadi al-Dhahab) province and in the quick attacks staged by the POLISARIO forces and a diplomatic form reflected in the mediation initiatives made by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba and PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, and recently by King Khalid of Saudi Arabia.

M'Hamed Boucetta, the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, has come to the United Nations to declare to its General Assembly his country's position vis-a-vis the Sahara conflict and to reveal the contents of the message which the Moroccan monarch had sent to the President of Liberia who is the current OAU chairman.

On this important message, on the Arab mediation initiatives and on Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's declaration that he is prepared to send Egyptian troops and war material to Morocco, AL-MUSTAQBAL has conducted the following interview with the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs:

[Question] How do you assess the Arab initiatives to settle the dispute between you and Algeria over the Sahara, especially the latest endeavor made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and King Khalid's visit to the Libyan Jamahiriya for this purpose?

[Answer] The fact is that this so-called Sahara issue was presented to the Arab group in the first summit held in Rabat in October 1974 and attended by all the Arab heads of state at the time. They asked questions, requested explanations and familiarized themselves with the dossier of

the issue and ended up with a united view toward the issue, including Algeria. Everybody knows that this area, i.e. the Western Sahara area, is a part of Morocco that was under Spanish colonialism. There was absolute Arab support at the time for supplying Morocco with all the material and moral aid to liberate this part of its soil. A change then took place in Algeria's position, thus turning this part of the Arab world into a point of tension and conflict.

[Question] What is the position of the Moroccan opposition toward this issue?

[Answer] We can be sure that all the Moroccans are unanimous that this issue is a national issue and that this spot must be restored to Morocco. There is opposition insofar as the other economic or cultural issues are concerned but there is absolute consensus over the Sahara issue. I would like to add that an initial mediation was made by the Arab countries in 1975 and was followed by other mediations whenever tension occurred in the area for fear that the conflict might turn into a comprehensive and destructive war. One of the latest mediations was made by President Habib Bourguiba who asked King Hassan II and the Algerian President to hold a meeting between them so that they may study whatever may bring the two countries closer to one another. Morocco's response to the convocation of the meeting was positive and immediate. But regrettably, the other side did not agree, saying that the matter does not concern it but rather concerns the so-called POLISARIO. I have learned while in New York that after his visit to the Libyan Jamahiriya, His Majesty King Khalid may be in contact with Habib Bourguiba on the issue of the mediation. I have nothing so far to indicate that there is agreement on a meeting to take place for this issue. But there are signs that demonstrate a sincere desire for His Majesty King Khalid and President Bourguiba to bring the views of Morocco and Algeria closer to each other, or at least to try to get King Hassan and President Chadli Bendjedid to meet with one another. This is all I have on this issue at present.

[Question] Do you welcome these efforts?

[Answer] Yes, and this was our attitude toward President Bourguiba's request. There is no change in our position that welcomes any mediation that may contribute toward settling this issue.

[Question] When President Chadli Bendjedid assumed power, it was said that one of his concerns was to settle the Sahara issue. Have contacts taken place between the two governments on this issue?

[Answer] No contact has been made. We have heard what you just mentioned about the presence of the desire to settle this issue which in fact is an issue between Morocco and Algeria. You know that large parts of Morocco were annexed to the Algerian administration when the French ruled the area. The French believed that Morocco was on its way to independence some day



whereas they considered Algeria a part of the French soil. This is why they stripped away parts of Morocco and annexed them to Algeria, as I have already said. These are the areas of (Tanduf, Bishar) and others. Some explanation can be found for the pressure currently exerted over the Western Sahara issue in Algeria's fear that Morocco may renew its demand for these areas whereas Morocco has always tried to surpass this issue of borders.

[Question] What are Morocco's conditions for settling the Sahara issue?

[Answer] Morocco has no conditions whatsoever. The Sahara issue is the issue of completing the unity of the Moroccan soil and of regaining what was usurped by the European colonist. A very important initiative has found its way to the light in the past few weeks and I will announce it officially in the name of Morocco in the speech that I will deliver to the UN General Assembly. King Hassan sent last month a message to the President of Liberia, who is also the current OAU chairman, asking him to consider the Sahara as a number of areas, some of which fall under the Moroccan control and some under the control of other countries adjacent to the Sahara, and stating that this area should be an area of cooperation and peace for the area's peoples. This initiative seeks to realize numerous goals, some of which are linked to the OAU charter's provision that seeks to turn the area into a means of cooperation among the members who belong to it. The initiative also seeks to realize one of the goals desired by both the Arab group and the African group, namely cooperation between the Arab and African countries. This is in addition to the endeavor to establish an Arab-African-European dialogue. All this can produce positive results for the Western Sahara that borders numerous Arab and African countries. This initiative also seeks to realize another important goal, namely to enable some countries that have no sea outlet, such as Mali, Chad and the Niger, to get such an outlet through the said cooperation.

[Question] Is this goal different from the trans-Sahara railroad?

[Answer] No. The railroad project seeks to link the north with the south. The cooperation I am talking about seeks to link the north with the south and the east with the west.

[Question] As long as the discussion is on the Arab countries' relations with the African countries, then why don't we talk about Morocco's relations with an Arab African country, namely Egypt? President al-Sadat has expressed his country's readiness to advance military aid to Morocco. He also said recently that 700 Egyptian troops were martyred in the battlefield with the Moroccans. Do you have any comment to make on this statement?

[Answer] Several statements have been carried by the wire services and the press. What I know is that the Moroccans are extremely sensitive to whoever supplies them with aid to defend their territories. This initiative by President al-Sadat has been received by the Moroccans with understanding and acceptance. However, as far as I know, President al-Sadat



declared that he will supply Morocco with war materials and not troops. There is no Egyptian army in the area. However, this does not mean that in its relationship with Egypt, Morocco has changed or will change its position toward the commitments that it has undertaken, be they the resolutions adopted by the 1974 Rabat summit or those adopted by the Baghdad summit. Morocco is still committed to these resolutions and will continue to be committed to them as long as the issue continues to be as it is at present.

[Question] Does this mean that you have accepted weapons and war material from Egypt?

[Answer] A statement has been made, as I have said, and the natural reaction of any people defending the unity of their soil must be one of understanding.

[Question] Does Morocco deny that it has received weapons from Egypt?

[Answer] I cannot deny or confirm. There is a statement and there is a Moroccan reaction to this statement.

[Question] Will you purchase weapons from the United States and what is the position of United States vis-a-vis the request that Morocco has submitted to purchase weapons from it?

[Answer] Yes, we intend to purchase weapons, as long as we need them, from the United States and from others. A few months ago, there was procrastination in the U.S. position on this issue but when the Americans understood the situation and understood that we are defending our sovereignty and our land, this procrastination disappeared. Our relations with the Americans are good at present.

[Question] So, has the United States agreed to sell you weapons and what types of weapons?

[Answer] There is presently no reservation by the United States on selling us weapons. I am no military expert to tell you what types of weapons they are.

[Question] Has the United States exerted any pressures on Morocco to change its position toward the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace?

[Answer] No, there is no pressure. After the Camp David accords, we explained to the United States the position that we adopted, that we have abided by and that we will continue to follow. This happened on the occasion of the visit that His Majesty King Hassan II paid to the United States last November.

[Question] Is there a plan for a visit by His Majesty King Hassan to the United States this year?

[Answer] Not now.

[Question] How do you assess the Moroccan-French relations generally and the French Government's policy on the Sahara issue?

[Answer] France has always expressed its view that it wants to remain neutral toward the Sahara issue. France being more aware of the truth than others, we ask it to make its testimony that this area is an indivisible part of Morocco. France, as well as Spain, knows this but wants to remain neutral. We leave it to this position of hers. Insofar as other issues are concerned, our relations with France are good relations.

[Question] Do you think that the ongoing mediations concerning the Sahara will be positive and that a settlement will be found?

[Answer] I believe that this issue, i.e. the so-called Sahara issue, is a fabricated issue intended to create tension in the climate of the area. Morocco is serious in its efforts to turn this area into an area of cooperation and solidarity. I hope that the latest initiatives will be positive in turning this area into an area of security and cooperation.

[Question] Do you hope [sic] this latest Moroccan initiative will have an impact on building the Greater Maghreb unity?

[Answer] I very much hope so because we have all grown up with the hope of unity of the Arab Maghreb. We will work with all our strength to achieve this goal.

[Question] Do you have an opinion on how to overcome the Lebanese situation of which you are aware?

[Answer] Lebanon's issue is one of the major issues preoccupying Morocco and an issue that grieves all the Moroccans. I say this because the Lebanon that we used to see as the gem of the Arab world has reached this degree of destruction and evil. We are doing all we can so that the Lebanese issue may return to three principles:

Respect for Lebanon's unity, respect for its sovereignty and respect for its independence.

Morocco's reaction to Lebanon's request for the convocation of an Arab summit to deal with the situation in the south--a request conveyed by President Sarkis' emissary--has been that it accepts and welcomes the convocation of this summit as soon as possible. We will exert efforts to make this summit come through. I hope that Lebanon will return as it used to be, the gem of the Arab world, as I have already said.

8494

CSO: 4402

USFP OPPOSITION LEADER DISCUSSES SAHARA PROBLEM, SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 19-25 Oct 79

[Interview with USFP [Socialist Union of People's Forces] leader Abdelwahad--  
date and place unknown]

[Text] It is, as has become suitable to call it, a social and political beginning. It is also the beginning of parliament. We met the president of the opposition USFP [Socialist Union of People's Forces] to examine with him various questions facing our country.

Question No 1 is that of safeguarding our territorial integrity in the face of the escalation of aggressions carried out against our country. The undeclared war carried on against the Moroccan people by opponents of our territorial unity requires a mobilization of all energy, but also a desire, and the political courage on the part of the government and its majority to take a certain number of political, economic, and social steps capable of really consolidating the domestic front.

What is the role which parliament could play in all this?  
Abdelwahad replied to this question.

[Question] The opening of the parliamentary session coincides with what they call a social and political beginning, of which it is a part. What are the main problems facing the Chamber of Representatives?

[Answer] Actually the Chamber of Representatives has no specific problems. If it were really the mirror of the nation, these problems would be its own also. But the problems which the country is debating are many and varied and have found no solution up to now.

In the first place there is the problem of our territorial integrity, which has been the subject of two extraordinary sessions, but without the chamber having the opportunity to engage in a debate in depth on the question with the government.

In the second place we have been witnessing an increasingly worrisome deterioration of the economic and social situation which has been apparent all throughout what they call the 3-year plan. And then there is especially the problem of education, which is mortgaging the future of many generations.

Finally there is the problem of individual, collective, trade union and political liberties which is urgent, particularly since the wave of dismissals and arrests of teachers, health officers and workers in the private sector unleashed since last April.

[Question] Let us begin with question No 1, which is that of our territorial integrity. What will be the role of parliament in working out a national defense policy capable of safeguarding our national gains?

[Answer] Up till now the contribution of parliament has consisted of voting credits destined for national defense, supplying moral and material support to our fighting forces and to all the initiatives in the direction of the completion and consolidation of our territorial unity, and missions of explanation and information designed to thwart the mystification propaganda of the opponents of our territorial integrity on the level of interparliamentary organizations, international agencies like the UN, and nongovernmental international organizations.

The USFP opposition has taken several initiatives in this context. It was the first to raise an oral question on the Sahara. It asked for a meeting of the committee of the interior and those of foreign affairs and defense following the attack against Tan-Tan, as well as holding an extraordinary session devoted to the Sahara affair.

The USFP opposition moreover effectively contributed to the explanation of the meaning and extent of national unanimity concerning the defense of our territorial integrity, which actually involves the destiny of our people, within several international organizations, governmental and nongovernmental, with friendly political and trade union organizations, and occasionally even to declared opponents to our national cause.

But all these activities in no way justify the fact that the Chamber of Representatives does not assume its constitutional responsibilities by controlling the action of the government and by outlining the strategy to follow.

[Question] Do the parliamentary delegations which go abroad and which are composed of members of the majority and the opposition adopt common positions concerning the different questions raised with the people with whom you speak?

[Answer] The fact of being part of a parliamentary delegation does not at all mean for the opposition that it aligns itself with the position of the government majority. Each time we have affirmed the unanimity of the Moroccan people concerning our national cause and have expressed our agreement with the other national political groups on this basic question.

Nevertheless that does not prevent us from explaining, each time that it is necessary to do so, our specific positions deriving from the line and decisions of our party and concerning the different social, economic, cultural, political and foreign policy spheres.

For example, at the time of our recent visit to Belgium and Luxemburg at the invitation of the Belgian Parliament, we developed the theses of the USFP throughout our contacts with local and European officials concerning the economic and political relations which the Third World should have with the industrialized countries, and in particular those of Morocco with the EEC. Relations which should be based on the abolition of links of dependence and on mutual respect and the safeguarding of the reciprocal interests of the peoples.

Thus we have publicly explained our own view of the conditions of our emigrant workers who contribute to the development of those countries but who are relegated to the status of a subproletariat subject to shameful exploitation and who are victims of a scarcely concealed discrimination in all fields. Our relations with these countries should have the goal not only of improving the living conditions of the emigrant workers, but of working over the long term to eliminate the very causes of the emigration, which constitutes one of the results of the colonial period and a consequence of underdevelopment which is itself only the result of unequal relationships between developed countries and their former colonies. On this point we have affirmed that our economic and trade relations with the industrialized countries should take account not only of an improvement in the terms of exchange, which in any case will maintain the links of dependence of our economy with the countries of the center, but of the vital necessity for our country to insure, by undertaking structural reforms, a development oriented mainly toward the satisfaction of the basic needs of our people and capable of making our country a valid participant on the international scene... In the same spirit we have brought up the situation of our students in Europe and the cultural relations of our country with those of the EEC.

[Question] The attitude of the Chamber of Representatives toward the socio-economic crisis and the deterioration of the conditions of life of the poor and middle classes resulting from the rise in prices and the freeze on wages...



[Answer] Actually the economic and social crisis which covers the country and which continues to get worse, is a secret to no one. The governmental majority itself, after long denying the existence of this crisis, yielded to the evidence after the royal speech of 4 June 1978. It then tried to minimize the seriousness of this crisis by attributing its main causes to the international business situation. Until the moment when the former finance minister recognized the structural character of the crisis on the occasion of the discussion of the recent law on finance.

But what has the Chamber of Representatives done to face up to this situation? It confronted it by enthusiastically approving the 3-year plan, a plan of stagnation, of disinvestment, and of continued pauperization of the masses disinherited by the worsening of unemployment. We said all this at the time.

The majority also approved the so-called austerity policy, which again favored the well-to-do classes at the expense of the poor and middle classes.

In addition, it approved in committee, between sessions, a law rectifying the finances which increased indirect taxes the main victims of which are the strata with the lowest incomes. It is true that there was a solidarity tax affecting the rich classes, but it is about time there was such a tax, and in short it is symbolic when one takes into consideration the enormous privileges which these classes enjoy.

Furthermore, despite the repeated promises of the prime minister and the finance minister not to raise the prices of basic commodities, the government has just decided to raise the prices of certain products of primary necessity, such as milk, sugar, and oil. Without taking account of the daily increases which occur for other products. In approving the law on finances, the majority even delegated part of its legislative power to enable it to proceed as it likes in raising prices.

All this shows that the majority ratifies the government decisions which, far from resolving the crisis or mitigating its effects, only increases it and aggravates its consequences.

As a consequence, the Chamber of Representatives, with a majority within it which systematically supports the class policy of the government, cannot face up to the crisis, the sole beneficiary of which is the class which it represents.

[Question] Public and trade union freedoms have been gravely infringed by the collective dismissals, arrests, and arbitrary sentences, etc..., especially after the wage demand action conducted by the CDT [expansion unknown] since last April. There are even elected representatives of the people who have been imprisoned. Can parliament intervene to stop this situation?

[Answer] In effect we have been witnessing since early last spring a marked violation of the political and trade union liberties guaranteed by the constitution. And the most flagrant measures taken by the government following the exercise by the workers of different sectors of their constitutional right to strike, were the collective dismissals of teachers, health officers, and workers of the private sector, as well as the arrests and sentencing of trade union and political officials.

The USFP opposition first condemned all these illegal measures. Then it demanded a meeting of the committees concerned, those of interior and education, in order to make the majority and the government face their responsibilities. Until now our demand has had no result because the procedure requires a majority resolved to convoke the committees. And you know that we do not have a numerical majority. So we think that in the face of the inertia of the bureau of committees and the indifference of the deputies of the majority either the governmental majority has no interest in the fate reserved to more than 1000 citizens or it purely and simply approves the arbitrary measures which have been inflicted upon them.

Furthermore the USFP opposition continues to demand the cancellation of these measures, especially during the extraordinary session held after the recovery of Rio De Oro.

[Question] How can the Chamber of Representatives contribute to the consolidation of the domestic front particularly in the face of the growing threats which weigh on our country?

[Answer] Since the recovery of the province of Rio De Oro the aggressions perpetrated against our country have multiplied while expanding increasingly in scope. We are therefore confronted with an undeclared war. Such a situation actually requires the mobilization of all energies, and more particularly those of the privileged classes, which should contribute financially to the national effort to the same extent as the poor classes which, until the present time have been the only ones to agree to all sorts of sacrifices since the unleashing of the process of liberation of our Sahara provinces.

The enthusiastic mobilization of the people's masses can be achieved only in a climate of confidence, of liberty, and social justice. The political, social, and economic measures necessary to bringing about such a climate are among the constitutional prerogatives of the Chamber of Representatives and the government. The obstacles to the commencement of this process are juridical or constitutional. It is above all a question of will and political courage.

6108  
C50: 4400

## BRIEFS

1980 FINANCE BILL--Rabat, Nov 13 (MAP)--"Despite the international economic conjuncture marked by the serious recession of 1974-1975, our country could record encouraging results in the recovery of our basic balances, thanks to the financial and economic policy adopted by the current three-year plan," stated the Moroccan finance minister, Abdelkamel Raghaye, here Monday. Presenting to the Moroccan House of Representative the 1980 finance bill, the minister made a roundup on the international economic conjuncture, outlining that the developing countries had been more or less affected by the slowness related to the economic activity and the strong inflation which affected the industrialized countries during the last years. After he recalled the choices of the plan, and the results reached, the minister asserted that the 1980 finance bill is (?based) on the four following points: endow the national defense with necessary financial means for ensuring the preservation of Morocco's territorial integrity; put at the disposal of social sectors sufficient credits, despite the policy of financial austerity drawn by the Moroccan Government; support the growth effort in the respect of fundamental balances without aggravating the fiscal pressure and finally, the intensification of the effort of national solidarity by the recovery of the "zakat" and its assignment to the development of poor regions. [Text] [LD131424 Rabat MAP in English 1244 GMT 13 Nov 79 LD]

CSO: 4420

FIGURES ON INDUSTRIAL FIRMS, WORKERS RELEASED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 7

[Article: "The Emirates: 20,000 Workers in Conversion Industries"]

[Text] The number of workers in the UAE's conversion industries sector has reached 20,000, and investments in this sector now total 2,278,900,000 dirhams. The conversion industries include foods, beverages, tobacco, lumber, furniture, paper, printing, publishing, chemicals, petroleum products, mineral ores, machines and mining.

These statistics include all 597 establishments which employ 10 or more workers. Some 82 percent of all establishments in the conversion industries sector are located in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah.

The results of the industrial survey conducted by the Ministry of Planning in cooperation with the UN Industrial Development Organization revealed that the manufactured metal products, machines and equipment industry occupies first place in the framework of the conversion industries with respect to both value added and number of workers. Firms in this category account for 475 million dirhams, or about 45 percent of total value added, and employ 28.4 percent of all conversion industry workers. Second place is occupied by the mineral ores products industry (excluding petroleum products), and coming in third are the lumber industries.

The information in the industrial survey indicates that the 597 establishments counted, which all have 10 or more employees and of which 501 firms responded, represent 18.8 percent of all establishments in the state's conversion industry sector. Firms with fewer than 10 workers represent the remaining 81.2 percent of the establishments in this sector.

The survey results also indicate that the heaviest concentration of industrial production production in the state is in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, where 82.8 percent of all conversion industry firms are located.

The emirate of Dubai is first with 199 industrial establishments employing 10 or more workers, followed by Abu Dhabi with 125, Sharjah with 91, 'Ajman with 43, Ra's al-Khaymah with 30, Umm al-Qaywayn with 8 and Fujayrah with 5.

8591

CSO: 4802

UAE OIL REVENUES REACH 18 BILLION DIRHAMS

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 7

[Article: "Trade Balance Surplus in Emirates Rises to 18 Billion This Year; Abu Dhabi Takes Control and Tips the Surplus Scale"]

[Text] The UAE's trade surplus at the end of the current year is expected to climb to 18.046 billion dirhams, as compared with last year's surplus of 17.897 billion. This fact was confirmed by a Ministry of Planning report on foreign trade and the trade balance for the state from 1975 to 1979. This surplus was achieved despite a large increase in imports, which amounted to 20.023 billion dirhams last year. This surplus provides important indicators of the strength of the state's economies, as well as the occurrence of building and industrial development and a renewal of funds set aside for investments. This is reflected in the steady growth in the volume of imports, inasmuch as intermediate goods and investment goods gained a large share of the imports.

Ministry statistics confirm that a substantial drop occurred in the importation of consumer goods during the last 3 years, countered by an increase in the rates of importation of machines, implements and equipment pertaining to industry, building activities and development plans. The statistics and information provide favorable indicators for the state's future progress.

The increase in imports, which amounted to 9.12 billion dirhams up to 1978, yielded returns in the area of industrial development and investments. In other words, it was not a parasitic increase or a burden on the state's economies. In this connection, the ministry's report states: "While consumer goods represented 27.1 percent of total imports in 1975, we find that they represented only 24.8 percent of total imports in 1977. Intermediate goods, on the other hand, represented 24.1 percent of total imports in 1975 but grew to 27.6 percent in 1977. Similarly, investment goods represented 16.4 percent of the total in 1975 and 47.6 percent in 1977. In other words, the percentage of imports for investments rose 31.2 percent in only 2 years. This is an encouraging figure and suggests some things with regard to industrial development and the quality of consumption. If we couple these results, which led us to a decrease in the percentage of consumer imports from year to



year, with the increase in the percentage of the population and new arrivals constituting a consumer force, this means that the rate at which imported consumer goods decreased was reasonable during the last few years--especially since the world experienced a substantial increase in the prices of these goods. The record increase in prices from 1975 to 1978 was 132.4 percent, a rise which applied not just to consumer goods but to all goods imported from abroad.

### Oil Exports

The UAE's oil exports for 1978 had a value of 23.429 billion [sic] dirhams--representing the exports of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah--while oil exports for 1975 were valued at 26.642 billion dirhams. In other words, oil exports showed an increase of 6.787 billion dirhams, or 25.5 percent. Abu Dhabi represents the bulk of the UAE's exports, since under normal circumstances it accounts for not less than 83 percent of the total value of the state's exports. An exception to this was the year 1978, in which Abu Dhabi sought to decrease its production and contributed only 79.7 percent of total oil exports. Dubai accounts for 18.8 percent of the state's oil exports, while the emirate of Sharjah contributes 1.5 percent.

The amount realized from the reexportation of a number of goods arriving at UAE ports was 1.776 billion dirhams in 1978, as opposed to only 594 million dirhams in 1975. Thus, the value of reexports is up by 299 percent--a large increase which goes a long way to illustrate how far trade activity has advanced within the state, as well as confirming the fact that some cities in the UAE have acquired a commercial character that is attracting the attention of neighboring states.

From a look at the trade balance of the UAE it is evident that Abu Dhabi, whose oil exports represent 83 percent of the state's total oil exports, bears the deficit which some emirates contribute to the overall trade balance. Moreover, it is Abu Dhabi which singlehandedly righted the trade balance and by stages made the trade surplus exceed the deficit for the UAE.

Thus, by means of the foregoing statistics concerning the trade balance of the state as a whole, we arrive at the fact that the deficit in the trade balance attributable to some emirates means nothing in relation to the overall trade balance of the state. As was stated before, the UAE's trade balance showed a surplus of 17.897 billion dirhams last year. Moreover, the surplus is expected to increase by the end of this year to 18.046 billion dirhams. This is attributable, of course, to the balancing operation brought under control by Abu Dhabi, as well as the steady increase in the UAE's oil exports.

8991  
C30: 4802

## BRIEFS

**FOREIGN INVESTMENTS**--The UAE has allocated 743 million dirhams (approximately \$190 million) in this year's budget for foreign investments in a total of 26 Arab, regional and international institutions. This year the UAE will participate with approximately 66 million dirhams (\$17 million) in the Arab Development Bank in Africa, as compared with last year's 26 million dirhams (about \$17 million). It will also increase its participation in the Islamic Bank to 107 million dirhams (about \$27 million), as compared with the 100 million dirhams (about \$25 million) invested last year. The state's total participation in international finance institutions, namely, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Agency for Development and the International Finance Corporation, amounted to 61 million dirhams (about \$16 million) this year. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 7] 8591

**EDUCATION BUDGET**--The graduated budget of the UAE's Ministry of Education and Instruction for this year is 1,212,130,000 dirhams, in contrast to last year's budget of 982,630,000 dirhams. In this regard, the state recently celebrated the 14th International Day for the Elimination of Illiteracy. For this occasion it prepared a report on the educational situation in the state. This report said that the UAE has made great and rapid progress in regular education programs, having been able in 7 years to establish kindergartens, elementary schools, preparatory schools, secondary schools, vocational schools and teachers institutes in all parts of the state. Then in 1977-78 the University of the Emirates opened its doors, thereby completing the stages of education. The report also revealed that the UAE's population had reached 862,000 as of the beginning of 1978. Of these, 635,000 persons had passed the age of 10, that is, the age of literacy. Some 191,000 of the latter were illiterate, consisting of 129,000 males and 62,000 females. There were 98 Centers for the Elimination of Illiteracy in existence last year, with 523 classes and a total of 12,258 male and female students. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 7] 8591

## WESTERN SAHARA

### ALGIERS CITES SDAR STATEMENT ON FIGHTING IN SAHARA

LD152138 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 15 Nov 79 LD

[Text] The Saharan cause has been gaining ground with the passage of time on both the political and military levels. The Royalist Moroccan invasion forces have suffered heavy defeats at the hands of the Saharan fighters. Furthermore, world solidarity with the firm right of the Saharan people to independence and self-determination continues to gain momentum. Only the Rabat regime and the imperialist forces refuse to recognize this right.

Following the recent military gains made by the Saharan fighters and the defeats they have inflicted on the invading Royalist Moroccan forces both in the Western Sahara and inside Moroccan territory, the Saharan Defense Ministry has issued a statement about new attacks made by the Saharan fighters against the invading Royalist forces, with in the framework of the Houari Boumediene offensive.

The statement said that these attacks took place on 4, 5 and 7 November against the positions and garrisons of the invading force in Bojador, Haguia and Semara. The Saharan fighters used heavy weapons in these attacks which resulted in many losses among the invading forces including 15 Royalist Moroccan soldiers killed and a similar number wounded, in addition to the destruction of installations and large quantities of military hardware.

The Saharan Defense Ministry statement added that the Saharan revolutionary fighters planted mines in various roads leading to the fortified positions of the Royalist forces. Some of the mines went off, destroying military vehicles of the invading forces. This happened on 31 October on the road between El Aaiun and Semara when four transport vehicles were destroyed, two of them loaded with troops.

CSO: 4402

WESTERN SAHARA

'L'HUMANITE' INTERVIEW'S POLISARIO'S ABDELAZIZ ON SAHARA ISSUE

LD081143 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 3 Nov 79 p 7 LD

[L'HUMANITE interview with POLISARIO Front Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz: "The French Government Should Reconsider Its Position"—date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] What conclusions do you draw from the visit which the delegation from the three European communist parties has just made to the West Sahara?

[Answer] We welcome this important initiative. It is part of the great campaign of solidarity which is constantly developing among the democratic forces. It shows us that the position of those parties and of the French, Italian and Spanish peoples is completely different than the position adopted by some of the governments in those countries. Therefore, we value this initiative and hope it might be consolidated by other democratic forces in those countries and throughout the world.

[Question] The French Government claims to be neutral. Do you see any change in the French position?

[Answer] So far our people have not noticed any change on the French Government's part. We legitimately hope that that government will learn from the over 4 years of that war in which it has blindly supported the aggressor countries—a position which not only challenges the OAU position and hence Africa's position, but runs counter to the peace process started by the POLISARIO Front and consolidated by the signing of the 5 August 1979 agreement with Mauritania, and runs counter to the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the region to peace and progress. That attitude is bound to be regarded as aggressive toward Africa, the international organizations and the region's peoples, including the Saharan people.

There have recently been attempts to mediate between Algeria and Morocco in addition to the Carter Administration's dangerous decision. Those

various maneuvers are aimed at strengthening Morocco's intransigence in its war of aggression against the Saharan people and at countering the international organizations' decisions in favor of a just and lasting settlement.

We have said and will repeat that any solution to the problem of Saharan decolonization and any mediation must take account of the main factor, namely the Saharan people and their sole legitimate representative, the POLISARIO Front. We regard the attempts you mention as maneuvers if they are not sound attempts and are aimed at bilateralizing the conflict by making it an Algerian-Moroccan problem whereas it is purely and simply a decolonization problem between the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic's people and the foreign forces of aggression.

[Question] During the French delegation's visit to the West Sahara many Saharan citizens showed their concern over President Carter's decision to step up his military aid to Morocco. Many said that if that decision were implemented they would feel they were at war not only with Morocco but with the United States itself. What is your view on this subject and do you envisage direct contacts with the U.S. Administration?

[Answer] It is only natural that we should express our disapproval and concern in face of those decisions. Our people are not only facing the Moroccan forces of aggression. There is a new threat in this decision by the United States which has hitherto declared itself to be neutral. Faced with this situation, we justifiably feel not only at war with Morocco but with all forces which support Morocco militarily and diplomatically.

For our part we see no reason not to establish contacts with any party involved in the war for the purpose of mutual explanations. We no longer need to prove our good will; our meeting with the Moroccan king's representatives at Bamako bear witness to it.

CSO: 4400



## WESTERN SAHARA

### ALGIERS CITES SDAR STATEMENT ON MILITARY VICTORIES

LD092256 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 9 Nov 79 LD

[Excerpts] Over 100 Royalist Moroccan soldiers killed, hundreds injured, scores taken prisoner and large losses of equipment and ammunition—these are the results of the successful military operations carried out by the Saharan People's Liberation Army [ALPS] during the past few weeks against the Royalist, expansionist Moroccan invasion forces in the area south of Uad Draa and other occupied Saharan towns.

A statement issued by the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] Defense Ministry said that the ALPS on 20, 23, 25 and 27 October attacked Smara, Zar and Tan-tan. During the first week of November, the Saharan Army attacked the invasion forces at Lenqueb, Lemseled and Touzqul, south of Uad Draa. During these victorious attacks, huge losses of life and material were inflicted on the Royalist Moroccan invasion forces.

The statement added that the Saharan fighters' attack against Lenqueb resulted in the destruction of the garrison post and that over 40 Royalist men and officers were killed and many others wounded. Four Moroccan soldiers were taken prisoner. The fighters also seized a mortar, 10 automatic rifles, 16 submachineguns and a radio.

After stating that the positions of the enemy forces in Bir Enzaran, Bojador and Hagunia were exposed on 4 and 5 November to concentrated fire from the Saharan fighters, the statement points out that an ALPS unit carried out a bold attack against the Bu Craa garrison. The attack was primarily directed against station 2 and 3 of the phosphate conveyor belt near El-Aaiun, the capital of the occupied Sahara.

The statement said that the Saharan unit succeeded, in the first few minutes of the attack, in destroying the two stations together with six pylons, causing severe damage to the phosphate conveyor belt.

During this bold attack, the statement said, over 60 Royalist Moroccan officers and men were killed and a similar number injured. A large number of

enemy vehicles were also destroyed together with their occupants. These included land rovers and [word indistinct], a large quantity of military hardware was also destroyed and a number of cars seized. Nine Moroccan soldiers were captured, including a captain.

Because of the successful military operations and triumphant attacks of the ALPS units, the Rabat regime's forces have waged a feverish offensive against the unarmed Saharan masses in the occupied towns.

The statement said that since 6 November, the Royalist occupation forces have been conducting terror campaigns and making arrests among the Saharan citizens in El-Aaiun. A large number of them are imprisoned in the jails of Hassan II.

CSO: 4402

WESTERN SAHARA

'L'UNITA' CARRIES COMMUNIQUE ON VISIT TO W. SAHARA BY PCI, PCE, PCF DELEGATION

LD081045 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 5 Nov 79 p 5 LD

[Unattributed report: "Three-Party Delegation Communique: PCF, PCE and PCI Solidarity With POLISARIO Front"]

[Text] The delegation of the French, Italian and Spanish communist parties which visited the Western Sahara early last week has released the following communique at the end of its visit:

As agreed in Madrid, a joint delegation of the French, Italian and Spanish communist parties, composed of PCF Politburo member Maxime Gremetz, PCI Directorate member Gian Carlo Pajetta and PCE Executive Committee member Jaime Ballesteros, has visited the Western Sahara at the invitation of the POLISARIO Front.

The delegation had in-depth conversations with Secretary General of the POLISARIO Front Mohamed Abdelaziz on the situation and the prospects for the struggle.

Accompanied by the interior minister of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] and several other POLISARIO Front political leaders, the delegation travelled several hundred kilometers across the country. It had talks on the politico-military situation with the SDAR defense minister, visited several refugee camps, a school, a hospital, a military college and a school for female cadres.

Thus the delegation acquainted itself with the situation of the Saharan people, its living conditions and its administrative organization under the direction of its unquestionable representative, the POLISARIO Front.

Everywhere it noted great popular activity and participation, a real management of their own affairs by the people and their determination in the struggle for their national independence and freedom, which is expressed in major military and diplomatic successes.

An examination of the military equipment captured by the POLISARIO Front fighters from the aggressors enabled the delegation to verify the aid given to Morocco by several governments, including in particular the United States, France and Spain.

Everywhere it went the delegation received a warm welcome for the solidarity it conveyed. It returns convinced that the only solution is an end to the Moroccan aggression and the initiation of negotiations with the POLISARIO Front, which will enable the Saharan people to live freely and independently in their own territory.

The representatives of the three parties assert the desire to further develop their political and material solidarity with the struggle of the Saharan people and the POLISARIO Front. They pledge to do their utmost to insure that it develops in each of their countries and that the governments of their respective countries contribute to a positive solution to this conflict in this area of the world.

This solidarity, the communique continues, will also be expressed in demonstrations of solidarity, which will be held in Paris, Madrid and Rome, which will be attended by PCF Secretary General Georges Marchais, PCE Secretary General Santiago Carrillo and PCI Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer.

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